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Preface 
Addressing the issue of domestic implementation of international environmental commitments, 
the LRTAP regime (i.e. Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution) is in 
several ways an interesting regime for the IIASA-based IEC project. IIASA has provided 
important inputs to the development of the "critical loads" approach within this regime. 
Moreover, compared to other international environmental regimes, the LRTAP regime is 
amongst those given most research attention so far. This reflects LRTAP's comparatively 
long history, the development of several "sub-regimes", and at least theoretical possibilities 
of conducting comparative analyses over time. Moreover, as already indicated, another 
aspect is the latter years' exciting "critical loads" development and close relationship between 
science and politics. A natural question to ask is: what kind of lessons can be formulated on 
the background of this literature so far? 
As the work on the present report has progressed, it has become increasingly clear that 
even if the pile of relevant implementation literature on the four selected countries (the UK, 
the Netherlands, Germany and Norway) is less voluminous than might have been expected, 
it is undeniably still a pretty tall order. Hence, it is necessary to emphasize the provisional 
character of the results presented in this report. Especially the discussions of the complex 
and important "domestic politics" aspects are rudimentary, both analytically and empirically. 
I have received general support and very useful comments in several rounds from the 
other members of the FNI IIASA team, Steinar Andresen, Torum Laugen, Jon Birger 
Skjaerseth and Olav Schram Stokke, and from IEC project co-leader David Victor. Other 
members of the IEC project group and Advisory Committee have provided valuable 
comments at project meetings. 
I also thank two projects that shared drafts of case studies: the EU-funded project on 
preparation, negotiation and implementation processes within the European acid rain context 
(i.e. LRTAP and the EU), led by Kenneth Hanf and Arild Underdal; and the project on 
Social Learning in the Management of Global Environmental Risks. 
Lars Nordberg at the LRTAP Secretariat provided me with useful information on many 
aspects of the LRTAP regime during a visit to the Secretariat in May 1995. Per M. Bakken, 
Harald Dovland and Mari Sather at the Norwegian Ministry of Environment also provided 
very valuable LRTAP information during some "sessions" in the fall of 1995. 
I would also like to thank AM Skarstad, FNI, for language assistance. 
Finally, I am of course solely responsible for the remaining and obvious shortcomings of 
this report. 
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Acid lessons? Assessing and Explaining LRTAP 
Implementation and Effectiveness 
1. Introduction. LRTAP: Why? How? What? 
Although much remains to be done, some work on the effectiveness and implementation of 
international environmental regimes has already been carried out. The LRTAP regime (i.e. 
Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution) is one of the regimes which has 
been given most research attention so far. This is due to reasons such as its comparatively 
long history, with the development of several "sub-regimes", and at least theoretical 
possibilities of conducting comparative analyses over time. Moreover, another aspect is the 
latter years' exciting "critical loads" development and close science-politics relationship. On 
the background of factors like the aforementioned, there is also LRTAP's role as a very 
interesting model for the development of other environmental regimes, such as the climate 
change regime. At this stage, therefore a natural question to ask, is: what kind of lessons can 
thus far be formulated on the background of this literature? At least two types of lessons, and 
hence purposes of this report, can be indicated. 
First, policy-makers (and I suppose many researchers too) would probably welcome relatively 
short summaries of the main knowledge on LRTAP international and national processes 
related to implementation and effectiveness. Hence, one important aspect of this work is to 
try to put together a condensed picture for other researchers, and not least for policy-makers 
- not to replace, but to facilitate and encourage further reading of the various existing 
contributions. 
Second, interesting (but tricky) questions (primarily) for researchers are questions related to 
the "status " of the knowledge produced so far. In other words: are research perspectives and 
findings so far conflictual or complementary? If conflictual, why? How "solid" is current 
knowledge with regard to different areas of LRTAP activity ("solidity" having something to 
do with several independent research projects reaching similar conclusions)? What are the 
main areas where existing knowledge is thin or lacking? As these questions are generally very 
tricky, this report only makes a modest, first effort to pin down some important areas where 
existing knowledge is in dispute, or is lacking. 
Hence, it should be noted that more weight is given to the former than the latter purpose, 
much due to the complexity of this "knowledge assessment" task. 
Another delimitation of the focus is to stress that the main focus is the LRTAP regime. As 
will be shown later, policy-making within the European Community (EC) and LRTAP is 
closely intertwined, both internationally and nationally. Although important EC processes are 
commented upon, they are not given the attention they "deserved" - if the purpose had been 
to sum up and assess knowledge on air pollution implementation in selected countries more 
generally. 
Hence, on this background, let us specify the focus in this report. Here is my suggested list 
of the "ten most frequently asked questions about LRTAP" to which I will provide tentative 
answers. Most of the concepts and issues touched upon in my background comments to the 
questions will be further clarified later. 
IS LRTAP A "HIGH-COMPLIANCE REGIME? 
I will revert to the interesting and complex relationship between compliance, implementation 
and effectiveness later, but the main thing to note here is whether states have reportedly 
followed up what they have promised to do internationally. The international conferences and 
general, policy fights between actors like the US and the EC often get a lot of international 
attention, but what happens afterwards is often ignored. Have emissions actually been cut? 
HAVE THE ACID RAIN PROBLEMS ADDRESSED BY LRTAP BEEN SOLVED SO FAR? 
WOULD THE PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN WORSE WITHOUT THE LRTAP REGIME? 
These are more or less the "effectiveness" questions. Here, the main thing to note is that 
although the answer to the previous compliance question may well turn out to be positive, 
problem solving may still be far away. Emission reductions goals set in the celebrated 
agreement may be very modest, so that fulfilling them faithfully may mean only modest 
environmental improvements. A more grave possibility may be that critical limits in the 
environment have been exceeded, so that emission reductions come too late to ensure fish or 
tree survival. 
However, low problem-solving may also be due to lags in environmental recovery processes 
and natural variations in the environment counteracting emissions reductions. Hence, low 
problem solving is not necessarily related to a behaviorally ineffective regime. 
ARE THE MAJOR CAUSAL FACTORS FOR COMPLIANCE LEVELS FOUND WITHIN THE 
SPHERE OF EMRONMENTAL POLITICS? 
The background for this question is of course that the level of a country's polluting emissions 
is influenced by a range of societal factors, and many of them having nothing to do with 
"environmental politics" in a strict sense. For instance, a country's own polluting emissions 
may decline due to industrial recession and production reductions, increases in energy prices 
leading to increased energy efficiency or development of nuclear options - to mention some 
possibilities. Such reductions cannot be counted either as international or national 
environmental policy successes. 
CAN "NATIONAL INTERESTS" ROUGHLY PREDICT LEVELS OF COMPLIANCE? 
Both scientists and policy-makers seek simple and parsimonious time-saving information, and 
the question here is whether there is an approximate correspondence between the rough 
national cost-benefit picture and the levels of compliance achieved. Research so far has 
indicated that the unitary rational actor and the "national interests" perspective has been a 
powerful analytical tool when predicting negotiating positions. But is it equally powerful in 
throwing light on the complex implementation processes? 
The background for this perspective and the one below is further discussed in section 4.1. 
WHAT ASPECTS OF DOMESTIC POLITICS MATTER MOST? 
"Domestic politics" can of course be classified and typologized in a number of ways. My 
suggested rough analytical scheme (somewhat inductively developed) distinguishes between 
five main categories of factors: first, regulatory philosophies ("general"1more long-term and 
"specific"1short-termlissue-related); second, intra-governmentallinter-ministerial power 
balance - e.g. how powerful is the Ministry of Environment?; third, the role of 
pollutersltarget groups - e.g. the degree to which they can be influenced by the government; 
fourth, the role of public opinion and "green" (NGO) forces; fifth, the "personal" factor - 
e.g. the "Thatcher factor". It should be noted that the important question of access and 
participation which is a special focus in this project is touched upon in all the three latter 
categories. An important, but again tricky, question is of course whether the "explanatory 
balance" is roughly similar in the selected countries - or whether this varies widely between 
the countries. 
WHAT ROLE HAS LRTAP PLAYED FOR NATIONAL "ACID REDUCTIONS", COMPARED 
TO OTHER INTERNATIONAL FACTORS AND "PURE" NATIONAL FACTORS? 
As stated earlier, the level and development of a country's polluting emissions are influenced 
by a range of societal factors, and in the cases, like acid rain, where these polluting emissions 
are also regulated by an international agreementlregime, it is of course interesting to try to 
assess the influence1"weight" of the international process in relation to the national policy 
processes. The classic question in this connection is: do regimes matter? With regard to 
"other international factors", in a European context, this is of course primarily the European 
Community/Union (hereafter, for the sake of simplicity, EC), which over time has developed 
substantial environmental policies on its own. 
ARE THERE CERTAIN FEATURES OF LRTAP INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN THAT HAVE 
BEEN MORE IMPORTANT THAN OTHERS? 
In comparison to the previous question, this question focuses solely on the international, 
regime level. Even if we found that the regime has strongly influenced national processes, 
not least for policy-making purposes, it is interesting to clarify which aspects of the regime 
have mattered most: effective decision-making rules? secretarial strength? confidence-building 
verification procedures? - to mention some interesting candidates. 
HOW HAVE THE MOST IMPORTANT INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES AFFECTED POLICY 
AND IMPLEMENTATION PROCESSES? 
This question goes even one step further in the "international" direction, and seeks to specify 
the mechanisms through which regime influence has been exerted. At least three main 
mechanisms may be indicated: 1) provision of information/knowledge; about the 
environmental problem, policy measures, other parties' implementation - among other things; 
2) provision of incentives; financial, through funds etc.; economic/political, through linking 
of issues and opening up the possibilities for gains in other issue areaslfuture negotiations; 
3) provision of authority and capability; e.g. the changes in the roles of flag, coastal, and 
port states under the new Law of the Sea. Knowledge about mechanisms may be interesting 
even if we find that total regime influence has been marginal. Such marginal regime influence 
may only mean that the mechanism has been over-shadowed by "malign" features of the 
environmental and policy problems at hand - e.g. polluting emissions stemming from core 
societal processes within the countries; features which may be less "malign" in other issue 
areas. 
ARE THERE MANY AREAS OF CONFLICTING ASSESSMENTS IN THE LITERATURE? As 
indicated earlier, this question turns the attention away from the substantial content of the 
information available information so far, and the tentative lessons to be learned, towards a 
more general assessment of the status of this field of research. Do the various authors present 
widely varying assessments and analyses, and if so, why? 
WHAT ARE THE MAIN CHALLENGES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH? 
Within the analytical scheme sketched above, where is current knowledge thin or entirely 
lacking? In other words: do we yet have satisfactory answers to the most vital questions? 
What about the focused issues of "access and participation" in this connection? 
Before delving further into the crucial concepts of compliance, implementation and 
effectiveness, and the actual compliance picture so far (section 3), let us roughly set the scene 
by summing up some important policy "landmarks" of the LRTAP process, and also provide 
a first overview of the main literature that the following "national" explanatory section 
(section 4) and "regime design" explanatory section (section 5) will build upon. 
More specifically, the explanatory section will be split in two main parts. As it is far beyond 
my capacity to cover all the LRTAP countries even quite briefly, and a specific Russian 
LRTAP case study is underway within the project, in section 4, I pick four countries for 
closer assessment: the UK ("net pollution exporter"; important "laggard "); Germany 
(important emitter; gradually important "pusher"); the Netherlands (generally interesting with 
regard to international and national environmental politics); and Norway ("net pollution 
importer" ; initial "pusher" getting into trouble. .). In section 5, I turn the country-specific and 
"individualistic" perspective more or less around and adopt an international and "holistic" 
regime perspective. In other words, from being a member of the "explanatory choir", the 
regime moves centre stage. Given the case study information specifically focused here and 
other empirical material, what do we know about the importance of the various aspects of the 
LRTAP regime design? Basically, I distinguish between "structural" and "regulative" aspects 
of regimes. Six structural factors may be discerned: participation/access; the role of the 
agenda; decision-making rules; the role of the secretariat; the organization of the scientific- 
political complex; verification and compliance mechanisms. Regulative aspects may be 
discussed on the background of keywords such as ""legal status", "specificity" and 
"differentiation". 
But first: some necessary background information. 
2. LRTAP Background: Rough Overview of Policy 
"Landmarks " and Literature. 
2.1. Policy "landmarks": development of the LRTAP regime. 
In 1968 the Swedish scientist Svante Oden published a paper in which he argued that 
precipitation over Scandinavia was becoming increasingly acidic, thus inflicting damage on 
fish and lakes (Oden, 1968). Moreover, it was maintained that the acidic precipitation was 
to a large extent caused by sulphur compounds from British and Central European industrial 
emissions. This development aroused broader Scandinavian concern and diplomatic activity 
related to acid pollution, and played a part in the adoption of "Principle 21" at the 1972 
Stockholm UN Conference on the Human Environment. This principle pointed out that states 
have an obligation to ensure that activities carried out in one country do not cause 
environmental damage in others, or to the global commons. The specific background for 
formal negotiations on an air pollution convention was the East-West detente process in the 
mid-70s, in which the environment was identified as one potential cooperation issue. Due to 
the East-West dimension, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) 
was chosen as the institutional setting for the negotiations. ECE is one of five UN regional 
economic commissions concerned with information and generally facilitating collaboration, 
with a membership of 34 parties, including the US and Canada.' 
The ECE Convention on "Long-range Transboundary Air Pollutants" (LRTAP) was signed 
by 33 Contracting Parties (32 countries and the EC Commission) in Geneva in November 
1979. Four main aspects of the 1979 Convention may be discerned: a) the recognition that 
airborne pollutants were a major problem; b) the declaration that the Parties would "endeavor 
to limit and, as far as possible, gradually reduce and prevent air pollution, including long- 
range transboundary air pollution" (article 2); c) the commitment of Contracting Parties "by 
means of exchange of information, consultation, research and monitoring, develop without 
undue delay policies and strategies which should serve as a means of combating the discharge 
of air pollutants, taking into account efforts already made at the national and international 
levels" (article 3); and d) the intention to use "the best available technology which is 
economically feasible" to meet the objectives of the  onv vent ion.^ The Convention did not 
specify any pollutants, but stated that measures should start with sulfur dioxide (Sod .  
1 For more information on these "formative" years, see for instance Park (1987) and McCormick 
(1989. 
2 Nordberg, L. : "Combating air pollution", LRTAP "non-paper", March 1993. 
The Convention has been in force since 1983 and has a current membership of 40 parties. 
Moreover, the Convention was to be overseen by an "Executive Body" (EB), which included 
representatives of all the Parties to the Convention as well as the EC. Furthermore, the ECE 
secretariat was given a coordinating function. The institutional structure has also included 
several Working Groups, Task Forces and "International Cooperative Programs". I will come 
back to this "scientific-political complex" in more detail in section 3. 
After the signing of the Convention, the next step in the cooperation was the 1984 EMEP 
Protocol whose basic objective has been to allocate the costs of the monitoring program. As 
this report is concerned with implementation of policy regulations, this protocol will not be 
further commented upon in this context. 
The first main regulatory step in the cooperation was the 1985 Protocol on the Reduction of 
Sulphur Emissions. At the third meeting of the Executive Body of the Convention in Helsinki, 
July 1985, 21 countries and the EC signed this legally binding protocol. The Protocol 
stipulated a reduction of emissions/transboundary fluxes of sulfur dioxide (SO2) by at least 
30% as soon as possible, and by 1993 at the latest, with 1980 levels as baseline. It came into 
force in September 1987. However, some major emitter states failed to join the agreement, 
the UK being the most important one. 
In the 1988 Sofia Protocol on Nitrogen Oxides (NO,), the signatories pledged to freeze NO, 
emissions at the 1987 level from 1994 onwards and to negotiate subsequent reductions. 
Twenty five countries signed the protocol, including the UK and the United States. Moreover, 
12 European signatories went a step further and signed an additional (and separate) joint 
declaration committing them to a 30% reduction of emissions by 1998. 
The next step was the 1991 Geneva Protocol on Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs). VOCs 
are a group of chemicals which are precursors of ground level ozone. The protocol calls for 
a reduction of 30% in VOC emissions between 1988 and 1999, based on 1988 levels - either 
at national levels or within specific "tropospheric ozone management areas". Some countries 
are allowed to opt for a freeze of 1988 emissions by 1999. 22 countries and the EC have 
signed the protocol.3 
The latest step so far is the new sulfur protocol, signed in Oslo in June 1994 by 26 Parties, 
and based on the "critical loads" approach. The aim of this approach is that emissions 
3 For more information on the protocols, see for instance McCormick (1989) and Sand (1990). 
7 
reductions should be negotiated on the basis of the (varying) effects of air pollutants, rather 
than by choosing an  equal percentage reduction target for all countries i n ~ o l v e d . ~  
Negotiations are currently underway on  a new protocol integrating new NO, and VOC 
requirements. 
2.2. Rough overview of existing LRTAP policy-oriented literature. 
Let us first turn to the major effectiveness and implementationprojects. To my knowledge, 
both the Tubingen regime project5; the OsloISeattle effectiveness project6; the 
DartmouthIHarvard effectiveness project7; the Clark project on social learning8; and the 
HanfIUnderdal project on implementation9 all include the LRTAP regime among their case 
studies. Only the HanfIUnderdal project focuses solely on  LRTAP (countries). 
4 For an analysis of the 1994 sulfur protocol, see Churchill, Kutting and Warren (forthcoming). 
5 See e.g. Rittberger (ed.) 1990; 1993. The main bulk of this work has been focused on the 
question of regime formation, and the usefulness of different problem and issue typologies for 
predicting and explaining regime formation. 
6 Around 1987188, the "OsloISeattle" effectiveness project was started, with Ed Miles and Kai Lee 
in Seattle, and, on the Oslo side, Arild Underdal, Steinar Andresen, Jon B. Skj~rse th  and the 
author of this paper as main participants. Empirically, the Oslo team has focused on seven 
regimes: the ECE LRTAP Acid Rain Convention; the Paris Landbased Marine Pollution 
Convention (PARCOM): the Barcelona Mediterranean Pollution Convention; the Vienna Ozone- 
layer Convention; the Oslo Marine Dumping Convention (OSCOM); the International Whaling 
Convention (ICRW); and the Antarctic Marine Living Resources Convention (CCAMLR). 
7 In 1991, the "DartmouthIHarvard" effectiveness project was established, with Oran Young at 
Dartmouth and Marc Levy at Harvard as project leaders (e.g. LevyIYoung, 1993). The empirical 
work within this project has focused on three regimes: intentional discharges of oil from ships 
(MARPOL); the fisheries of the Barents Sea; and transboundary air pollution in Europe and 
North America. 
8 This project is organized around the concept of "social learning" and led by William C. Clark 
at Harvard University. It is also in its final stages (Clark et al., forthcoming). The aim is to 
understand the long term interaction among governments, nongovernmental organizations, the 
private sector, the scientific community and the media in shaping the response of ten countries 
or country groupings to the emerging threats of acid rain, stratospheric ozone depletion, and 
climate change. 
9 Ken Hanf, Erasmus University, and Arild Underdal, University of Oslo, are heading a 
collaborative project on preparation, negotiation and implementation processes within the 
European acid rain context (i.e. LRTAP and the EU), financed by the EU Commission (Hanf 
and Underdal, 1994). A central focus is the links between the preparatory phase - the 
formulation of national positions and preferences - and the implementation phase. The policies 
of ten European countries are studied by almost as many country teams. 
With regard to books and articles, the pile of relevant material is of course quite large. 
Starting with books, one of the "pioneer" studies on the LRTAP cooperation is Rosencrantz 
and Wetstone's 1983 "Acid Rain in Europe and North America", containing a number of 
country "profiles" and an early assessment of cooperative perspectives. The next frequently 
mentioned book is C.ParkYs 1987 "Acid Rain: Rhetoric and Reality", which contains one 
chapter on the various dimensions of the international politics of acid rain. A book in much 
the same vein is J.McCormick's 1989 "Acid Earth", with most of the book summing up 
various natural scientific and technological dimensions related to acid rain, and essentially one 
chapter devoted to LRTAP politics and achievements so far (mainly based on official emission 
statistics). A most relevant book in this connection is Boehmer-Christiansenlskea's 1991 
"Acid politics", which is a comparative assessment of the development of acid rain politics 
in West Germany and the UK, including special sections on the roles of the European 
Community and LRTAP in this process. The 1989 report by E.Chossudovsky, "East-West 
Diplomacy for Environment in the United Nations", offers a thorough account of the 
negotiations leading up to the 1979 Convention. With regard to the development of the 
regime, by far the most detailed account and analysis hitherto is found in T.Gehring's 1994 
book "Dynamic International Regimes - Institutions for International Environmental 
Governance". 
Turning our attention to articles and chapters in books, the 1990 article by C.Ian Jackson, "A 
Tenth Anniversary Review of the ECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution", also comments upon the establishment of the Convention. The aforementioned G. 
Wetstone published a more up-dated assessment of the LRTAP regime in 1987; "A history 
of the acid rain issue", in BrookslCooper "Science for public policy". P. Sand offers a nice 
overview of the development of the LRTAP regime in his 1990 article "Regional Approaches 
to Transboundary Air Pollution". A general overview is also provided by A. Fraenkel(1989). 
The title of R. Shaw's 1993 chapter in G. Sjnstedt's (ed.) "International Environmental 
Negotiation" speaks for itself, "Acid-Rain Negotiations in North America and Europe: A 
Study in Contrast". In an almost similarly titled report edited by Sjnstedt in 1993, there are 
two contributions commenting upon the LRTAP regime: L.Bjnrkbom's "International 
Environmental Policy in a Wider Context" and G.Persson's "The Acid Rain Story". M.Levy 
published the most thorough effectiveness assessment of the LRTAP regime so far in 1993, 
"European Acid Rain: The Power of Tote-Board Diplomacy", as a chapter in Haas, Keohane 
and Levy (ed.), 1993. He has also published a more recent analysis of the LRTAP regime 
in the 1995 Green Globe Yearbook (Levy, 1995). Sprinz and Vaahtoranta's 1994 article "The 
interest-based explanation of international environmental policy" investigates how factors like 
abatement costs and ecological vulnerability influence state policies toward controlling air 
pollution (see also Sprinz, 1992). J. G. Lammers offers an overview of both LRTAP and EC 
policy-making processes in "The European Approach to Acid Rain" (1988). Churchill, 
Kutting and Warren (forthcoming) offer an analysis of the 1994 sulfur protocol. 
Regarding EC air pollution policies and the relationship to LRTAP, I can only briefly refer 
to for instance Haigh 1987, 1989; Boehmer-ChristiansenISkea 1991; and Liberatore, 1993. 
Summing up, the pile of relevant material is of course quite large. However, the number of 
theoretically-founded LRTAP effectiveness studies is not so high; as far as I can see, five or 
six such case studies exist. The implementation literature is so far even sparser; the main 
drafts having so far been produced by the "Social learning" and HanfIUnderdal projects. 
3 .  C o m p l i a n c e ,  Implementation and Effectiveness: Concepts 
and LRTAP Performance So Far .  
3.1. Some further, conceptual comments. Establishing a rough, initial 
measuring rod. 
As announced earlier, the concepts of compliance, implementation and effectiveness need 
some further clarification. Turning first to compliance, it is first important to state that there 
is no crystal-clear international understanding with regard to the meaning of the concepts of 
"compliance" and "implementation".10 This is understandable, as there are clearly areas of 
overlap. Nevertheless, I would suggest to define compliance simply as the extent to which the 
targets/policy goals in the international agreement have been achieved or not. As targets and 
policy goals can vary a lot, then compliance can simply be achieved by passing a national law 
and/or establishing an emissions reductions program - if the international agreement only calls 
for "national measures to be established". If the international agreement more specifically 
calls for say a 30% reduction of sulfur dioxide, then compliance can only be achieved by 
trustworthy reports of such a national reduction having taken place. However: thinking related 
to compliance is not interested in the background for the reductions achieved; they can be 
purely coincidental, for instance related to a general economic recession leading to reduced 
industrial activity. The sole interesting thing in a compliance perspective is: have the targets 
been achieved or have they not? 
On the background of the discussion above, are there really any differences between the 
concepts of compliance and implementation? In some respects, I would say no. Also 
implementation has to do with the extent to which the international targets/policy goals have 
been achieved or not. But when we speak about "implementation", I find it reasonable to be 
much more concerned about the inherent societal processes. If for instance fuel switching 
automatically reduces your emissions with 30%, you have surely achieved compliance, but 
it would be misleading to say that you have actually "implemented" the international decision 
if you have not raised a finger in that connection. Hence, I suggest that implementation has 
to have something to do with actual, national measures undertaken tofulfil the agreement. 
Such measures can be of the more "formal" type, as a natural first step is the establishment 
of national laws and reduction programs. But the "real" implementation test is whether the 
behaviour of problem-creating target groups can be influenced and changed. Moreover, as 
implementation in the sense indicated above involves an effort to establish causal links to the 
10 For discussions of the compliance concept, see for instance Chayes and Chayes (1993) and 
Mitchell (1994). For discussions of the implementation concept in this context, see for instance 
AndresenISkjaersethlWettestad (1995) and Najam (1995). 
international agreement, it goes almost without saying that implementation is an analytically 
more demanding concept than compliance. 
Turning to the much-debated effectiveness concept, in an earlier paper 
(AndresenISkj~rsethlWettestad, 1995), we have argued for a growing consensus on two main 
perspectives: a "political" perspective and an "ecological" perspective. The core element of 
the political perspective is national politicallbehavioral change, related to the regime. 
Compliance and implementation processes are integral elements of such processes of 
behavioral change - hence the placement of these two circles inside the wider effectiveness 
circle. But "true" effectiveness can be said to be something morelelse: solving the resource 
or environmental problem that spurred the international cooperation. Hence, as most 
explicitly formulated by the DartmouthIHarvard effectiveness project (LevyIYoung, 1993), 
there is a certain relationship between these perspectives: politicallbehavioral changes and 
implementation processes are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for resource or 
environmental problem solving. For instance: full implementation of a 30% reduction target 
may look nice, but may be less impressive if an 80% reduction is needed to really solve the 
problem. 
With these conceptual deliberations as background, let us have a closer look at the actual 
LRTAP compliance figures. 
3.2. The LRTAP compliance picture summarized. 
As already indicated, there are five subsequent policy processes and related regulatory 
protocols to focus on - and actually six processes when including the six first formative years 
leading up to the sulfur protocol. However, a complicating factor is of course that two of 
these processes and protocols have a fairly short history. The VOC process took place in the 
early 1990's (protocol was signed in November 1991), and the sulfur renegotiations were 
quite recently concluded (June 1994). Moreover, the 1984 EMEP protocol concerns funding 
of the monitoring program and is therefore not so interesting in a policylregulatory context. 
Hence, it is not surprising that the attention of analysts so far has been directed almost solely 
at the first three processes: the "formative years"; the impactlimplementation of the sulphur 
protocol; and the impactlimplementation of the NO, protocol. However, as the obligations 
in the 1979 Convention were quite general, in terms of compliance, it is natural to focus on 
the 1985 sulfur protocol and the 1988 NO, protocol and declaration. 
"The sulfur compliance picture" 
At the third meeting of the Executive Body of the Convention in Helsinki, July 1985, 21 
environment ministers signed the legally binding "protocol on sulfur emissions", basically 
calling for a 30% reduction by 1993, with 1980 as baseline. The largest polluters who refused 
to sign the protocol were the UK, Poland and Spain; these three together accounting for about 
23% of Europe's 1980 sulfur emissions. 
An EMEP report from August 1990 sums up the 1989 "mid-term" progress. Interestingly, 
only five countries had not already achieved the 30% target in 1989 - USSR and Hungary 
were quite close (around 25%); Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria were making more marginal 
progress; only East Germany's emissions had actually increased. Six countries had already 
achieved 50% reductions or more (Austria and Sweden being the "leaders" with 64 and 59%), 
and five countries placed themselves somewhere in the "forties" (Norway, Finland, Denmark, 
Switzerland, and the Netherlands). With regard to the non-signers, three countries had 
achieved marked reductions around or above 20% (UK was in the lead with 27%, with 
Portugal and Ireland having achieved around 20% reductions); a group of six countries had 
achieved small or no reductions at all (among them Spain), and in two countries, emissions 
had increased considerably (Turkey 28% and Yugoslavia 40%). On average, the signers were 
doing markedly better than the non-signers. 
Compared to the 1989 figures, there are few surprises in the final compliance picture 
(LRTAP secretariat, "1994 major review on strategies and policies for air pollution 
abatement"; see annex 1). However, political changes in Eastern Europe led to a somewhat 
different picture. Two of the signersinon-compliers have changed considerably midterm. The 
main part of the former USSR - i.e. Russia - joins the compliers with a fair margin (around 
50%). Ukraine and Belarus also make it into the complier club. Although East and West- 
Germany have merged, the new, united Germany achieves compliance with a fair margin 
(close to 50 % reductions). Several countries have achieved around 70 % reductions (Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden). Regarding the non- 
signers, there are some interesting features. The UK has landed on 37%, thus making it a de 
facto complier. Portugal has actually increased its emissions, while there are no figures for 
Spain after 1990. 
Summing up: given that the 21 Parties overall reduced emissions by around 48%, and that 
all the Parties have reached the target, the 1985 sulfur protocol part of the LRTAP regime 
must be said to be characterized by very high compliance. 
"The NO,, conpliance picture" 
As can be recalled, the 1988 NO, protocol called for the stabilization of emissions at the 1987 
level from 1994 onwards, and the related political declaration (signed by 12 countries) called 
for a 30% reduction by 1998. The main compliance picture may be summed up in the 
following manner (for a comprehensive overview, see annex 2) : 
First, considerable data problems complicate compliance assessments. For instance, Italy, 
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Spain, and the European Community have not reported NO, 
emission levels for the years after 1991. Moreover, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and the 
European Community have not reported emission data for the base year 1987. 
Second, existing data indicate that 18 of the 25 Parties had stabilized their emissions in 1990 
and overall reduced them by 4% by 1993. Three Parties have increased emissions by 4 to 41 
% above 1987 levels. 
Third, as indicated by the overall 4 %  emission reduction so far, progress in relation to the 
30% declaration target is so far modest. Austria, Denmark and Switzerland are the only 
countries which seem to be reasonably on schedule so far (15-20% reductions). 
Summing up: although assessments are complicated by considerable data problems, 
compliance with the 1988 protocol seems to be fairly high. However, the perspectives with 
regard to the related 30% reduction target are not very bright. 
" Wzat about VOCs ? " 
Data are here very scattered so far. However, of the eleven countries (out of 23 Parties) 
providing data for 1993, an overall reduction by around 15% may be noted (see annex 3). 
3.3. Some brief notes on problem solving so far 
As already indicated, no matter how the compliance questions discussed above turn out, 
environmental problem solving may still be far away. So what may be said about this tricky 
issue so far'? The more recent discussions and model development related to the "critical 
loads" concept may give us certain indications. Hence, if problem solving is seen as 
synonymous with the achievement of "critical loads" (see section 2) in Europe, then it is clear 
that most countries have quite some way to go before these "critical targets" are achieved. 
The targets in the new sulfur protocol aim at minimum 50% reduction of the gap between 
1990 sulfur depositions and the critical levels in the environment. Hence, even if for instance 
the UK achieves its 80% emissions cuts targets within 2010 (with 1980 as baseline year), then 
the country's emissions will still be some 50% above "ideal" levels. 
Another matter is that there is no direct, linear relationship between emission cuts and 
environmental improvements. We are talking about gradual and cumulative processes, where 
both positive and negative effects may only be seen years and even decades after changes in 
emissions. Take for instance the Norwegian situation: over the same time that emissions in 
Europe have been cut by around 40%, acidification damages in Norway have gradually 
increased - up to a 1995 peak damaged area, with over 110 000 km2 receiving more sulfur 
than nature can handle (Miljerspesial Sur Nedberr, January 1995). Moreover, although the 
rainfall has become less acid in recent years, acid deposition has not decreased accordingly, 
due to increased rainfall patterns. 
Hence, summing up, the acidification problems have probably been reduced somewhat, but 
"solution" and getting below "critical loads" in the environment is partly a matter related to 
the implementation of newly established regulations, and in reality extending well into the 
next century. 
Explaining Compliance : Some In~portailt Country Profiles 
4.1. Introduction 
As it is far beyond my capacity to cover all the LRTAP countries even quite briefly, and a , 
specific Russian LRTAP case study is underway within the project, I have picked four 
countries for closer assessment in this connection: the UK ("net pollution exporter"; important 
"laggard"); Germany (important emitter; gradually important "pusher"); the Netherlands 
(generally interesting with regard to international and national environmental politics); and 
Norway ("net pollution importer"; initial "pusher" getting into trouble. .). 
Inspired by Underdal's three models for explaining compliance and implementation (1995), 
I group and discuss the countries' performance according to two main perspectives. The first 
"national interests " perspective focuses on the overall cost-benefit picture related to abatement 
measures. As stated by Underdal (1995), "this model focuses attention on the calculations that 
a single, rational decision-maker would go through in deciding whether or not to act as 
prescribed in an agreement" (p.2). In other words, in this perspective, a "progressive" 
negotiating position and a willingness to sign an agreement do not necessarily mean 
implementing activities and compliance. It should also be noted that parts of the damage cost 
reductions in this perspective have to do with changes in other countries' policies; "the more 
important the benefits that comes from the compliance of others, the more the incentives to 
comply will depend on the impact of an actor's own behaviour upon the behaviour of its 
partners" (Underdal, ibid.:5). Both scientists and policy-makers seek for simple and 
parsimonious time-saving information, and hence an interesting question is here: do we really 
need to know more than a country's basic interest structure, with regard to costs and benefits 
to account for the implementation performance of countries? Research so far has indicated 
that the unitary rational actor and the "national interests" perspective has been a powerful 
analytical tool when predicting negotiating positions (Sprinzlvaahtoranta, 1994). But is it 
equally powerful in throwing light on the complex implementation processes? 
The other "domestic politics" perspective relaxes the unitary actor focus of the first 
perspective, and focuses on how various domestic actors, with sometimes conflicting 
interests, shape the implementation processes and outcomes. According to this model, neither 
national positions nor implementation records can be understood simply as a derivative from 
some "objective" calculation of national material interests. Underdal (1995: 12-13) indicates 
three main deviant points: first, decision-makers as well as the general public conceive of 
costs and benefits in "subjective" terms, and values and beliefs may differ significantly 
within, as well as across, societies; second, actors are concerned not only with maximizing 
net national welfare; they typically have some more "parochial" concerns that affect their 
behaviour; and third, political systems distribute influence and power unequally, and political 
processes tend to produce outputs and outcomes that can deviate systematically from those 
that would maximize "net national welfare" as conceived of in the unitary rational actor 
model. 
"Domestic politics" can of course be classified and typologized in a number of ways (for a 
comprehensive overview over reasonable assumptions and propositions, see Underdal 1995). 
My suggested rough and simplified analytical scheme in this context focuses on five main 
categories of factors: 
1) regulatory philosophies ("general"1more long-term and "specific"1short-termlissue- 
related), where it for instance can be assumed that factors like the weight given to 
"precautionary" policies and the degree of "interventionism" and the general weight given 
to economic decentralization and privatization can influence implementation efforts; 
2) intra-governmentallinter-ministerial power balance, where there are of course a number 
of interesting dimensions, related to the distribution of power and influence among 
different branches of government; the extent to which the government controls state 
policy; and the extent to which the state in effect governs and controls "its" society 
(Underdal, 1995 : 17); 
3) the role of pollutersltarget groups, where for instance consultation procedures and 
participation patterns in earlier policy phases can be assumed to influence implementation 
efforts; 
4) the role of "interested thirds" like public opinion and "green" (NGO) forces, where an 
interested and critical public and a strong and active NGO community can be assumed to 
strengthen implementation efforts; 
5) the "personal" factor - e.g. the "Thatcher factor", which serves as a reminder that policy 
and implementation performances may sometimes be heavily influenced by the political 
and ideological visions of strong leaders. 
It should be noted that the important question of access and participation which is a special 
focus in this project is touched upon in several of these categories. An important, but again 
tricky, question is of course whether the "explanatory balance" is roughly similar in the 
selected countries - or whether this varies widely between the countries. 
In addition, the broader questions of "international factors" and regime influence are 
discussed separately. It should be noted that the two models point to different mechanisms 
for regime influence. The "national interests" perspective pinpoints possible implementation 
bonuses or sanction costs, while the "domestic politics" perspective pinpoints the impact that 
the regime may have upon the domestic distribution of formal authority and influence and 
incentives generated by the act of signing (Underdal note, 1995: 17). 
Moreover, some general comments to the (implementation) knowledge situation are provided 
for each of the cases. As this knowledge situation varies quite a bit, and the commitments 
taken on also varies a bit (e.g. the UK and sulfur), there are certain minor "adaptations" of 
the common structure outlined above. 
The first focused case is the UK. 
4.2. The UK story: "process laggard" and "rough complier" ... 
4.2.1. A rough overview of the knowledge situation 
Regarding the more general acid rain policies of the UK, these are commented upon for 
instance in RosencrantzIWetstone (1983); Park (1987): McCormick (1989); Boehmer- 
Christiansedskea (1991); Boehmer-Christiansen (1995); and Boehmer-ChristiansenIWeidner 
(1995). My main sources with regard to the more specific implementatiodeffectiveness 
questions are McCormick (1989); Boehmer-ChristiansenISkea (1991) (hereafter: BIS); 
Waterton (1993); and Boehmer-Christiansen (1995). Overall, it seems fair to say that UK, 
along with Germany, are the best-studied countries in this connection so far. 
4.2.2. The LRTAP compliance picture to be explained. 
Regarding sulfur, although the UK was not willing to sign the 1985 protocol, it has achieved 
a 37% cut in emissions in the time period in question. With regard to NO,, after related long 
wranglings and compromise solutions within the EC context, the UK signed the 1988 
protocol, and has seemingly achieved the 1994 freeze target (based on 1995 figures) (ECE, 
"Strategies and Policies for Air Pollution Abatement", 1995). Hence, it seems to make sense 
to speak about an international "process laggard" and at the same time, a "rough complier". 
How, then, has this come about? 
4.2.3. The "national intereststt perspective. 
Point of departure: throughout the 1980's, the UK produced around 4 million tonnes of SO2 
per year (e.g. 4.9 million tonnes in 1980 and 3.8 million tonnes in 1990), making it the 
biggest emitter in Europe and fourth biggest in the world. It has been producing around 2.5 
million tonnes of NO,, making it one of the five biggest producers in the world. It derives 
over 90% of its energy needs from fossil fuels, and most of that from coal-fired power 
stations. As the coal and electricity were in public ownership during the 1980s, policy-making 
has been characterized as "partially determined by the distinct framework within which the 
nationalized industries have operated" (B/S:121). Other countries account for only around 
10% of all acidity in UK rainfall (e.g. McCormick, 1989:93-94), so the role of the UK 
within the European atmospheric system is one of "major net exporter". 
Turning then to the general cost-benefit picture; as imaginably assessed by a central decision- 
maker, can this be assumed to have been very clear at the beginning of the two processes, 
and did it change drastically over time? Turning first to SOzrelated costs and the situation 
in 1985, given the position of the UK as a major emitter and "net exporter", on the surface, 
it seems reasonable to expect major costs being related to emissions reductions. However, 
when talking about costs in this connection, it is useful to distinguish between "general" 
emissions reductions costs and "specific" (retrofitting) reductions costs. "General" reductions 
costs are related to all sorts of "external" industrial and economic processes, and in the case 
of UK, it is not certain that these costs would be very high, in order to achieve the 30% 
reductions goal. The UK's sulfur emissions fell by 37% between 1970 and 1984, allegedly 
due to industrial recession and increasing use of sulfur-free natural gas (McCormick, 
1989:lOl). Energy demand peaked in 1979, remained lower in the 1980s than in 1973 
(B/S: 130). Similar processes probably continued up through the 1980s and into the 1990s.. . 
However, "specific" reductions costs were potentially higher and more uncertain. These costs 
were mainly related to the eventual retrofitting of the Central Electricity Generating Board's 
(CEGB) power stations with flue gas desulfurization (FGD) technology. l 1  For instance 
related to the 1984 House of Lords proposition to retrofit two power stations and generally 
cut sulfur emissions by 30%, CEGB claimed that this would cost 2 billion pounds, raise 
electricity costs by l o % ,  and increase unemployment (McCormick, 1989: 102). The preferred 
technological option was the "Pressurised Fluidised Bed Combustion" (PFBC), but this 
technology was not satisfactorily developed yet (Waterton, 1993:20). On the other hand, 
Friends of the Earth's (FOE) cost analysis of reducing the CEGB's SO2 emissions by 60% 
by 1995 (mainly based on FGD retrofitting) suggested that this could be achieved by an added 
4 %  on the price of electricity to consumers (Waterton, 1993:70). According to B/S, the 
government deliberately leant towards the highest cost estimates, knowing that this would 
automatically guarantee Treasury opposition.. . (p.215). To my knowledge, no independent, 
comprehensive input to this debate was produced. Another potentially important dimension 
to this debate was the government's plans to build several nuclear power plants in the 1980s 
and 90s, hence forming the perception of the acid rain problem as a temporary one, and not 
11 It can here be noted that 60% of the power output comes from 12 large coal-fired power 
stations, see B/S: 143. 
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worth spending much money on.. .(Waterton, 1993: 18). Hence, it seems fair to say, overall, 
that costs were uncertain, but potentially high. 
With regard to benefits, there was some reported lake acidification and forest damages in the 
first part of the 1980s. But many parts of rural UK was not covered by monitoring stations 
until the late 1980s, including Wales, one of the areas which have turned out to be worst 
affected by acidification (McCormick, 1989: 11 1 ; Waterton, 1993: 10;39). Still, available 
evidence made the Environment Committee of the House of Commons state in its 1984 
report: "immediate and hard financial decisions have to be taken as time is running 
out.. .Enough is now known to justify the development and application of technology for 
removing the causes and effects now abundantly apparent" (cited in McCormick, 1989:99). 
However, other reports at the time, like the one from the House of Lords European 
Communities Committee challenged the certainty of the link between acid depositions and tree 
damage. Hence, although environmental benefits related to abatement efforts were probable, 
the size of these were marginal and clearly disputed. 
Hence, overall, although both costs and benefits were disputed in the mid 1980s, as is often 
the case, costs probably seemed more tangible and specific - much falling on the powerful 
actor CEGB - than the environmental benefits involved. For instance, BIS sums up the picture 
like this: "The cost of retrofitting existing power plants with flue gas desulphurization would 
have had a major impact on public finances without any apparent compensatory benefits" 
(p.278). 
Moving on to the NO,-related rough costs and benefitspicture, this issue is very much related 
to EC negotiations on the Large Combustion Plants (LCP) directive and the vehicle emissions 
directive, both initiated by Germany in 1984. As this directive was aimed both at sulfur and 
NO, emissions, and at power plants, the cost discussion is probably pretty similar to the story 
told above; it is hard to discern the specific NO, component. This is easier with regard to the 
vehicle issue, more directly aimed at NO, emissions. The FRG's aim was the US vehicle 
standards for new vehicle types, meaning in practice catalytic converters for all new vehicles. 
The UK opposed this idea vigorously, due to the commitment to "lean-burn" technology by 
the nationally owned British Leyland and Ford Europe. The benefit picture is probably quite 
similar to sulfur; in brief, moderate and diffuse. 
Briefly summing up, the rough cost-benefit picture may have seemed fairly similar to British 
authorities at the establishment of both protocols: on the one hand, potentially high costs, 
falling on specific societal actors; on the other hand, more moderate and diffuse benefits. If 
so, why did the UK refuse to sign the sulfur protocol, but agreed to take on the 1988 NO, 
stabilization requirement? 
4.2.4. The "domestic politics" perspective 
Here, it seems reasonable to distinguish between two main questions: first, how can domestic 
political factors account for acid rain policies in the first part of the 1980s? Second, why the 
"conversion" to a more active policy1"implementation" from the late 1980s on? 
4.2.4.1. The "initial ", "malign " picture 
"Regulatoiy aspects/philosophies " 
Let us first turn to the situation in the early 1980s. In this connection, the first natural 
explanatory perspective has to do with regulatory philosophy. One may distinguish between 
"general", more stable dimensions of regulatory philosophies and more "specific", temporary 
dimensions. Let us first turn to an important "specific" dimension. In brief: the Thatcher 
government believed strongly in free enterprise, and sought actively to minimize industry 
regulations. "Privatization" was an important keyword. At least in the case of the UK, this 
philosophy was unfavourable to acid rain policies in two respects; first, given the energy 
structure, major emissions reductions had to include new regulations and power plant 
retrofitting. Although electricity privatization only began in practice in 1988, ". . .ironically, 
given the government's ultimate intention of freeing the industries from state control, the 
1980s saw even tighter controls on the nationalized industries, particularly on their finances" 
(BIS: 123). Second, general deregulation and privatization plans meant increased uncertainty 
about the future ability to live up to national and international commitments - even if the 
general wish to do so increased. 
Turning to some "general" dimensions, first, the British give general weight to the importance 
of having sound scientific bases before taking action. In the acid rain debate, although the 
international transport debate was very much over by 198314, considerable uncertainty 
remained, for instance regarding the relationship between depositions and effects, both in the 
main "importer" countries and in the UK itself (Waterton, 1993: 19-20). Not surprisingly, this 
uncertainty was utilized for all it was worth. In this connection, it has been maintained that 
scientific uncertainty functioned as a "fig leaf" for underlying economic and political interests 
(Boehmer-Christiansen, 1995:28). It should also be noted in this connection that the CEGB 
funded a variety of research projects in this area; almost half the UK's total expenditures in 
the early 1980s. The DOE increased its research efforts from 1980 on (B/S:207-9; Waterton, 
1993 :44-50). 
A second, "general" regulatory philosophy dimension that should be mentioned is the 
allegedly British general weight given to "implementation soberness"; in other words, not 
signing agreements which it was uncertain it could implement (Boehmer-Christiansen, 
1995:87-88). This was cited as a reason for not signing the 1985 SO2 protocol; according to 
McCormick (108), this was another "fig leaf" for other, underlying interests. 
"Intra-governmental/inter-ministerial power balance" 
Cutting a much longer story short: according to McCormick (1989: 109), the environmental 
policy-making structure is "confused and piece-meal", and the "misnamed" Department of 
the Environment has been characterized as weak and more geared towards local government 
issues than the natural environment (BIS: 109-1 1). The Treasury Department is characterized 
as the most powerful of the departments, and sceptical to any proposals with public 
expenditure proposals. The department of Energy (DEn) has been characterized as a powerful 
actor, defending the interests and policy objectives of the energy sector. Likewise, the 
Department of Transport (DTp) held "a strong stance in defence of its interests". In addition, 
the Department of Industry (DTI) advanced deregulation, and sought to ensure that 
environmental controls did not hinder the competitiveness of British industry (Waterton, 
1993: 3-4; BIS: 1 1 1- 12). This general climate allegedly also gave other important actors like 
the CEGB high freedom of action. However, as already indicated, in 1984, reports from both 
the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, the Environment Committee of the House 
of Commons, and (somewhat more moderately) the House of Lords European Communities 
Committee all called for cuts in UK SO2 emissions. Hence, there were quite centrally placed 
political forces calling for new measures. But they were obviously not strong enough ... 
A specific example is mentioned by BIS: DOE argued in a "crucial" 1984 meeting of the 
"inner circle" (see below) for the UK joining the "30% club", but lost to CEGB's scientific 
uncertainty-based arguments (p.2 15). 
"The role of target groups" 
According to Boehmer-Christiansen (1995), target groups like industry and car manufacturers 
have held and hold a strong position in policy development and implementation processes, 
viz. "the UK will not agree to specific targets until implementation is virtually promised by 
industry" (p.87). Before and during privatization, the cooperation of industry has been 
particularly important for the government, and made confrontation "quite impossible " (p. 87). 
Hence, implementation so far has largely been an affair between government and industry, 
the electricity utilities and car manufacturers (p.88). 
"The role of 'interested thirds'" 
The role of public opinion throws further light on the impotence of the "green" forces in 
these years. In brief, the acid pollution problem never became an important public issue in 
the same way as it did in West Germany or Scandinavia. For instance, it was not until 1983 
that Friends of the Earth launched their Acid Rain Campaign (Waterton, 1993:76). This is 
partly related, as indicated earlier, to the lack of visible damages, but also related to deeper 
"cultural" aspects; " . . .British environmental interests tend to be focused on landscape rather 
than air quality" (BIS: 277). However, a certain discrepancy between the general disinterested 
public and some activistING0 forces should be noted here. 
"The personal factor" 
Here, several authors emphasize Margaret Thatcher's particular style of decision-making, 
relying on the discussion among a few selected, key scientists and policy-makers. This seems 
to be how, for instance, the 1984 decision not to join the growing "30% club" came about 
(B/S:215; Waterton, 1993:18). 
4.2.4.2. Changes in the picture.. . 
Turning to the situation in the late 1980s, one may throw light over both the sulfur 
"conversion" and NO, picture. Important policy changes took place both in 1986 and 1988. 
In 1986, the CEGB announced the decision to fit FGD technology to three power stations, 
and to fit low NO, burners at its 12 largest coal fired power stations, aiming to reduce NO, 
emissions from these stations by up to 30% by 1998 (Waterton, 1993:28). In 1988, as 
indicated earlier, the UK agreed to both the EC LCP and vehicle emissions directives. In 
terms of the explanatory perspectives discussed above, the role of the public opinion 
seemingly changed somewhat from the mid 1980s on. Acid damage to the UK countryside 
became more visible, although the extent of damages remained disputed throughout the 1980s. 
For instance, the Forestry Commission stated in 1987: "There is no sign of the type of 
damage seen in West Germany occurring in Britain at the moment" (Waterton, 1993:83-86). 
Moreover, the personal factor is seemingly also here of some importance. The visit of Lord 
Marshall of the CEGB to Scandinavia in 1986 is mentioned as an important background factor 
(Waterton, 1993 :23-24). Moreover, the first results of the CEGB-funded SWAP program 
allegedly also influenced the 1986 changes (Waterton, 1993: 17;45). . But in order to throw 
more light on these processes, it is necessary to bring in the international perspective more 
systematically. 
4.2.5. The role of international factors. 
The UK drew fire from two international contexts in the 1980s: the LRTAP regime and the 
European Community. Within LRTAP, especially Norway and Sweden led a campaign in 
order to put pressure on the UK. As a part of this, Norwegian scientists engaged in 
collaborative research projects with British researchers, like for instance the SWAP program 
("Surface Water Acidification Project"), focusing on the impact of acid rain on the soil, 
waterways and fisheries of Norway and Sweden. 
Within the EC, political forces led by Germany put pressure on the UK. First, there was the 
Large Combustion Plant (LCP) negotiations, started in 1984. In June 1988, the UK agreed 
to cut its sulfur emissions from existing combustion plants by 20% (1993); 40% (1998); and 
60% (2003), with 1980 levels as baseline. 
Second, the negotiations on the vehicle emissions directive was initiated by Germany in 1984. 
FRG's aim was the US vehicle standards for new vehicle types, meaning in practice catalytic 
converters for all new vehicles. The UK opposed this idea vigorously, due to the commitment 
to "lean-burn" technology by the nationally owned British Leyland and Ford Europe. As the 
EC context is not my main focus here (important as it is), suffice it to say that the ensuing 
battle between governments, the car industry and environmentalists ended in the 
"Luxembourg (compromise) package" in 1987, requiring only cars with engines above 2 litres 
to have catalytic converters, affecting only 10% of the cars manufactured in the UK 
(Waterton, 1993 34-35). . . . 
These negotiations were conducted simultaneously with the LRTAP NO, protocol 
negotiations, and it seems reasonable to assume that the outcome of the EU processes more 
or less set the stage for the UK's decision to sign the NO, protocol. Hence, the 
implementation of the NO, protocol can also possibly be seen as a mere externality of the 
UK's implementation of the EU directives. 
On the whole, there seems to be much evidence pointing towards the conclusion that 
international pressure and processes have played a quite important role for the evolution of 
British acid rain policies, e.g. given the overall rather lukewarm domestic interest in the 
issue. But: which settings have mattered most - LRTAP or the EC? Levy (1993: 124) argues 
for an important initial role for LRTAP: "It is highly unlikely that the sulfur reduction 
measures adopted by the British government would have been adopted in the absence of the 
sulfur protocol". This is primarily based on the role of the protocol as a "landmark" that 
exerted a profound influence on the domestic debate. According to Levy, to argue that the 
sulfur protocol did not play a role for the Brits, one would have to argue that the Norwegian 
and Swedish pressure alone would have been sufficient to bring about the same policy 
changes. However, this leaves open the question with regard to the possible interplay between 
Scandinavian and EC pressure even at this stage. In the name of fairness, Levy does 
emphasize the importance of especially German pressure within the EC for the UK policy 
changes from 1988 on (p. 126). Boehmer-ChristiansenKkea seem to put a little more emphasis 
on the EC context: "The successful international pressure on the UK to moderate its policy 
came not from Scandinavia, where there is conclusive evidence of environmental damage to 
which the UK contributes, but from the FR Germany which is relatively unaffected by UK 
emissions and from the EC where one of the major concerns is uniformity of control costs" 
(p. 283). 
Another matter is that formal implementation of the EC directives only started in the late 
1980s, and hence played only limited roles for the reductions achieved within the 1993 
LRTAP context. On the other hand, there is the tricky analytical possibility of "anticipatory" 
measures, so the issue needs further investigation. 
4.2.6. Concluding comments 
First, it is important to note that only a limited "amount" of formal implementation has so far 
taken place in the UK, given that no formal commitments were undertaken before 1988. 
Moreover, as research usually lags somewhat behind policy development, this means that 
there is not much UK "acid implementation" research to build on so far. For instance, an 
important piece of work like Boehmer-ChristiansenISkea was published in 1991. Keeping this 
in mind, there are still some relevant questions to ponder about. 
"Why a 'process laggard' ? " 
Some important points: generally, "export" of pollution and relatively marginal domestic 
damages have reduced the weight of domestic abatement benefits compared to more tangible 
costs, such costs falling mainly on the electricity industry at a time of tight restrictions on 
public expenditure. 
Turning to the more specific points: "general" and "specific" regulatory philosophies were 
unfavourable to governmental, preventive policies. 
Moreover, relatively weak governmental environmental bodies had a tough match in intra- 
governmental fights; 
Important "target groups" like industry and car manufacturers had a strong position in policy 
talks; 
Although there were some important social actors arguing for tougher measures, the public 
at large were moderately interested. 
"Why a 'rough complier'? " 
Primarily "nonl'-environmental processes like economic recession and energy changes 
(reducing the role of coal and the power of unions) were seemingly pretty important; 
Also some "environmentally related" measures seem relevant (e .g . 1986 measures), related 
to international pressures. In addition, more weight was given to the import of low sulfur coal 
and the construction of additional gas generating capacity (Waterton, 1993:29). However: 
actual retrofitting and implementation started in the early 1990s, so their importance for the 
1993 and 1994 targets is uncertain.. . l 2  Moreover: EC processes were relatively more 
important for NO, than for sulfur compliance; 
Generally, far more attention has seemingly been given to the UK's role of 
"process laggard " than to explaining actual, rough compliance. 
"Some further comments to the knowledge situation" 
Generally, the case seems to be far more a matter of there being certain tricky areas of little 
or no research than actual conflictual assessments so far. This is partly related to the fact that 
several contributions build on the seminal "Acid Politicsw-book by Boehmer-Christiansen and 
Skea. Two interesting, somewhat related tricky areas where not very much has hitherto been 
done are, first, the question of the interplay between EC and LRTAP processes - both with 
regard to general policy-making and the related implementation processes. However, two 
recent contributions by Sonia Boehmer-Christiansen go some way in rectifying this situation 
(Boehmer-Christiansen, 1995; Boehmer-ChristiansenIWeidner, 1995). The second area of 
interest is the international-domestic interplay. For instance, B/S states that "international 
pressure, unless accompanied by similar domestic demands, is likely to stimulate an initially 
defensive response from countries accused of transboundary pollution.. .In the UK. .other 
political factors tended to militate against action, until international pressures, coupled with 
a rapidly evolving domestic agenda, converged to permit the formation of a more limited acid 
emissions abatement plan" (282-83). Here, an interesting, further "access question" is to what 
extent and how the various British pro-acid controls forces utilized information from and 
access to the LRTAP discussions and processes. 
More generally, with regard to the access perspective, the challenge related to the UK would 
be more to pull together existing information and do some limited interviewing, partly with 
some key authors, more than having to dig up very much new material. For instance, 
Waterton covers the NGO activity quite well (pp.65-80). 
12 According to Boehmer-Christiansen (1995), FGD retrofitting has recently largely been 
abandoned (pp.67-68). 
4.3. The German story: "process pusher" and "complicated complier".  . 
4.3.1. A rough overview of the knowledge situation 
Regarding the more general acid rain policies of the FRGIGermany, as was the case for the 
UK, these are commented upon in Rosencrantz/Wetstone (1983); Park (1987): McCormick 
(1989); Boehmer-ChristiansenISkea (1991); JagerICavender Bares/Blumhuber/Loerbroks 
(1993); Boehmer-ChristiansenIWeidner (1995) and WahlISprinz (1995). My main sources 
with regard to the more specific implementatiodeffectiveness questions are Boehmer- 
ChristiansedSkea (1991) (hereafter: BIS) and Jager et. al. (1993). Overall, as already 
indicated, Germany are among the best-studied countries in this connection so far. 
4.3.2. The LRTAP compliance picture to be explained. 
Germany was originally a LRTAP "laggard" in the negotiations leading up to the 1979 
Convention. A radical policy shift took place in 1982, related to the "Waldsterben" crisis. In 
short, the "Waldsterben"1pine forest dieback phenomenon had gradually got increased 
attention, culminating in 1981 in among other things a report on potential SO2-related 
vegetation damage from the Council of Experts on Environmental Questions (SRU) and a 
three part series on "Waldsterben" published in "Spiegel". Germany has since then taken on 
a "pusher" role in the LRTAP cooperation. 
With regard to the sulfur process: as can be recalled, the new, united Germany ended up as 
a clear complier in relation to the 1985 sulfur protocol, although with a more complicated 
period in the early 1990s. This has of course primarily to do with the unification process, 
with the environmental "leader" West Germany teaming up with the definite "laggard" East 
Germany (whose emissions actually increased in the latter part of the 1980's!). It is therefore 
primarily interesting to focus on the performance of West Germany up to 1990191. As can 
be recalled, BRD was well on its way in the 1989 tentative review, having reduced by about 
55 %. 
Regarding NO,, the picture is pretty similar: high performance up to 1990191, for instance 
with the electricity industry reducing its emissions by 50% of their 1982 value. Still, 
according to the most recent LRTAP review report, in 1992, Germany had reduced NO, 
emissions with around 15% in relation to the 1987 baseline, making it the second best 
performer in the "NO, class". 
What has been the background, then, for this quite impressive performance? 
4.3.3. The "national interests" perspective. 
Point of departure: according to the LRTAP 1994 review, the amount of SO2 emitted in 1980 
was 3,2 million tonnes, falling to 2,4 million tonnes by 1985; the FRG being the fourth or 
fifth biggest emitter in Western Europe. Power plants and district heating plants have 
contributed around 56%; coal-fired power plants have contributed around 28% of total 
emissions (Jager et.al., 1993:33). Compared to the UK "net, large exporter" position, the 
German "exportlimport" balance sheet has been much more even: roughly as much has been 
exported as imported (e.g. Park, 1987: 165). The annual amount of NO, emitted has been just 
below 3 million tonnes (LRTAP 1994 review), and here the transport sector has been by far 
the most important source. 
On this background, let us turn to the cost-benefit picture, as imaginably assessed by the 
government. This may, in fact, in many ways be seen as quite clear. Due to various previous 
regulatory activity, it is quite probable that the 30% reduction was achieved already in 1985. 
German air pollution regulations date back to the mid-60's, and with the Federal Clean Air 
Act established in 1974 as an important intermediate step. However, the clearly most 
important piece of legislative action was proposed toward the end of 1981, related to the 
increasing concern about dying forests. This was an Ordinance on Large Combustion 
Installations, the GFAVo. When the GFAVo was finally adopted in 1983, it had been 
considerably strengthened. It applied to 1500 power stations, aiming at halving SO2 emissions 
by 1993 (e.g. McCormick, 1989: 131). According to BIS, "Most of the coal-fired power 
stations in the FR Germany were fitted with flue gas desulphurization (FGD) equipment over 
a remarkably short period of time, between 1983 and 1988" (p.6). Moreover, according to 
McCormick (1989: 131), 25% emissions reductions were achieved in 1985 (compared to 
1980). Hence, the specific costs related to complying with the 1985 LRTAP protocol were 
probably close to zero. The 30% reduction and even considerably higher reductions lay 
inherent in regulations and policies adopted before the 1985 protocol. However, the more 
general costs of cleaning up the power stations and implementing the GFAVo has been 
estimated to be around 21 billion DM (B/S:201). This is probably related to the fact that it 
is more costly to retrofit the FGD technology to an existing power station. According to BIS, 
FGD will add around 15 % to the basic cost of a modern conventional coal-fired power station 
(p.45). With regard to NO, reduction, the basic industrial technology is the "selective 
catalytic reduction" (SCR) processes. Around 7 billion DM, out of the 21 billion referred to 
above, have been spent on SCR retrofitting (B/S:201). 
Turning to benefits, with regard to reductions in pure "domestic" damage costs, this must 
probably be characterized as uncertain, but potentially quite significant, even if politics is kept 
out of the picture. As a background, it should be noted that one-third of FR Germany is 
covered with forest, and of this, over one-third is privately owned. While most forests are 
exploited for timber, they also raise income through hunting and tourism (BIS: 67). The forest 
damage threat perception changed quite dramatically during the first part of the 1980s. 
According to the Minister of Agriculture, in 1982, most of the German forest was not 
damaged - the damage area was estimated to cover about 8 %  of the forested area, and 314 
of the damage was not considered "serious" (although increasing) (Jager et.al., 1993:44). In 
1983 the damage area was estimated to 34%, and in mid-October 1984 a survey indicated 
50.2%!. The total proportion of forests either moderately or seriously damaged peaked at 
19% in 1985, double the 1983 level (BIS: 190). The Federal Interior Ministry warned that 
economic damage worth several thousand million DM per year would result if damage to 
forests continued to spread (McCormick, 1989:129-30). BIS refer to estimated annual 
damages in the range between 10-40 billion DM (201), however this figure is much more 
controversial than the abatement costs.. . 
What about "international" benefits, then? As domestic damages were seemingly quite 
substantially related to domestic emissions, the "international" benefits were probably much 
related to economic competitive aspects. But there was also some "purely environmental" 
sense in making others reduce their emissions, as about 50% of the air polluting substances 
was "imported" from other states (Jager et.al, 1993:41). In other words: a strong compliance 
performance would underpin German leadership efforts in establishing and implementing 
international regulations - which in turn would mean "fairer" competitive conditions for 
German industry, and contribute to reduced domestic damages. B/S (186) put it like this 
"...GFAVo constituted both a deed done unilaterally and a model to be followed by others. 
It was confidently expected in 1983 that European partners would be required to follow the 
German example in good time" (p. 186). But, on the whole, domestic factors were probably 
by far the most important for air pollution regulation, at least the GFAVo portion of it. 
4.3.4. The "domestic politics" perspective. 
"Regulatory aspects/philosophies" 
Turning first to the question of regulatory philosophies, a first aspect to note here is the 
German weight on Law and the legal system. In the 1970s, this allegedly led to a system with 
very impressive regulations and procedures (e.g. the important and several times revised TA 
Luft directive), but much more limited "real" action. This has changed after 1982. Moreover, 
in the late 1970s, industry itself actively sought new, federal air pollution legislation to avoid 
being faced with differing local regulations (B/S:282). 
A second general aspect is the "Vorsorge" or precautionary principle, introduced in the 
SPDIFDP government's environmental program already in 1971. A crucial element here is 
the ability to act before scientific certainty has been established, and the principle has been 
given weight by shifting governments, social-democratic and conservative. 
Thirdly, one may note a generally quite "interventionist" economic management tradition (at 
least compared to the UK), through regulation or financial assistance - either due to strategic 
significance or in order to achieve broader economic objectives (BIS: 124). Pollution control 
programmes did not run counter to this tradition.. .However: in the field of energy policy, the 
role of market forces has been stressed in the 1980s (B/S:133). 
"Intra-governmental/inter-ministerial power balance " 
The next perspective has to do with inter-governmentallinter-ministerial power balance. 
Setting the bureaucraticlpolitical scene: compared e.g. to the UK, the German party-political 
scene is more complex. Until around 1980, four parties dominated the scene: the Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU); the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU); the Social Democrats 
(SPD); and the small Free Democratic Party (FDP). Important in this connection: the 
emerging green movement brought a fifth party to the bargaining and coalition scene in 1980: 
the Green party, competing not least with the FDP about middle class voters.. . The regional 
dimension is also potentially more prominent here than for instance in the UK, due to the 
federal structure of the political system, with significant powers delegated to the ten (now 15) 
Lander. Moreover, the federal structure implies frequent elections, and hence a basic 
sensitivity of political parties to changing public moods. With regard to the ministerial set-up, 
up until 1986 (and the Chernobyl accident. .), pollution control responsibilities lay with the 
"influential" l 3  Federal Interior Ministry (BMI). In 1986, the smaller and more specialized 
Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Protection and Reactor Safety (BMU) was 
13 B/S's assessment, p. 106. 
established. Other important ministries in this connection are the Federal Ministry of 
Economics (BMWi) and the Ministry of Finance (BMF). There is no separate energy 
ministry, and the BMWi is also responsible for energy policy. 
SPD and FDP formed a governmental coalition in the years 1969-82. All three Interior 
ministers between 1969 and 1982 were FDP members, and all the ministries most directly 
involved in the air-pollution debate of the early 1980s were in FDP hands - Foreign Affairs; 
Economics; Agriculture; and Interior. When Helmut Kohl and CDUICSU took over in 1982, 
the FDP lingered on as a coalition partner, and kept control over the finance ministry. 
On this surnrnarical background, let us zoom in closer. As the "roots" of the FRG compliance 
picture very much seem to stem back to politics in the early 1980's, the more general 
(eco)political situation in these "crucial" years has to be focused. Turning first to political, 
organizational factors, it may be possible to discern some more or less counterbalancing 
factors. On the one hand, there are several factors giving extra political energy to the issue 
of air pollution regulation from the early 1980's on. First, there is the general political 
situation in the early 1980's. It has been argued that the need for coalition politics to form 
governments at both local and central levels, and a related almost permanent campaigning 
atmosphere, helped the Greens and increased the general salience of both energy and 
environmental issues. According to BIS, in the early 1980's, a green party political 
competition started. Partly it was the established parties against the Greens, partly it was 
related to a general scramble for power between SPD and CDUICSU, with FDP as joker in- 
between (see e.g. BIC: 189-99). 
Moreover, the already mentioned media-fuelled " Waldsterben" political uproar in 198 1 I82 
is of course a "catalytic" event, both regarding German domestic politics and its international 
position on the issue. Among the seemingly worst affected1"acidified" areas was the 
Bayerische Wald in Bavaria, and Bavaria has been the main CSU base. Hence, there was a 
regional political aspect pulling in favour of environmental protection. 
Third, another "BavariaICSU factor" occurred when the CSU took control over the ministries 
responsible for forests and the environment after 1982. In addition, according to BIC, "the 
small FDP, their role in German politics threatened by the Greens, controlled the economics 
ministry which ceased its opposition to acid-emission controls in 1983. Viewed against this 
background, the policies adopted by the FR Germany take on an air of inevitability". . . (108). 
On the other hand, speaking of regional politics, as indicated, regional government is very 
strong in Germany, and one may easily envisage the Federal government having problems 
with establishing and implementing environmental ambitious policies vis-a-vis the Lander 
(local governments). However, several general and more specific factors seem to have 
reduced this potential problem. First, there has been an increasing trend for environmental 
regulations to fall within the competence of the Federal government as opposed to the 
individual Lander. In the case of acid rain, among other things a potential domestic 
"transfrontier" conflict between e.g. coal-producing North Rhine-Westphalia and Bavaria 
encouraged Federal initiatives, and the industry preferred Federal, more uniform rules. 
Second, although the Lander are responsible for virtually all of the implementation and 
enforcement of Federal legislation, according to BIS, the pressures for national uniformity 
are strong and are encouraged by a common bureaucratic tradition, legal education and the 
ownership patterns of German industry (BIS: 102-104). 
"The role of target groups" 
The role of industry warrants a special comment, being the single most important "target 
group". German coal-burning electric utilities were not state-owned, and according to BIS, 
in the early 1980s "were cash-rich, enjoying healthy profits and facing no capital expenditure 
programs" (p.194). Hence, they were in a vulnerable position when the opinion turned 
gradually more green. Moreover, the "remarkable" speed with which the FGD retrofit 
program has been carried out reflects a number of factors: the perceived urgency of the forest 
damage problem; the availability in the early 1980s of spare industrial capacity which could 
undertake the massive construction program; and allegedly that many power stations run at 
relatively low annual utilization rates with annual downtimes for maintenance, providing 
ample opportunities to retrofit (B/S:200). 
"The role of 'interested thirds': public opinion, NGOs, scientists" 
Turning then to the role of the public opinion and the "green NGO forces", first and 
foremost, there is of course the more general, cultural German affinity for trees and forests. 
According to McCormick (1989: 128), the "Tannenbaum" of Christmas carols (the Norway 
spruce) is almost a national symbol. As already indicated, a third of the area of the former 
FRG is covered by forests. In connection with the "Waldsterben" uproar in 1981182, forestry 
farmers and powerful hunting associations in Southern Germany joined the green movement 
in calls for action. However, as indicated by BIS, there are also other culturallhistoric factors 
which may shed light on the more concerned stance of the German public, for instance 
compared to the British situation. Hence, a second factor is the need for "undangerous" 
universal issues which may unite the political left and right; viz. "It is ironical that, in 1982, 
both Britain and the FR Germany realized extraordinary degrees of national unity over 
particular issues. For Britain, national unity came from the Falklands war and its echoing of 
a lost international role. The German endeavour was a massive technological and economic 
'fix' aimed at drastically curbing emissions from power stations, industrial chimneys and car 
exhausts". . . (p.69). 
More generally, the green movement has been far stronger in FRG than in the UK, related 
to the rapidly increasing "Burgeriniativen" and eventually the BBU (the Federation of 
Citizens' Groups for Environmental Protection) in the early 1970s . Also the activity of the 
green movement culminated in 1983184 (for an overview, see e.g. WahlISprinz, 1995). 
Moreover, it should also be noted that senior politicians in Germany were allegedly highly 
willing to communicate directly with the public about environmental issues, and encourage 
the perception about certain environmental threats (BIS: 113). 
The role of scientists has been characterized as ambiguous. On the one hand, German 
scientists allegedly knew that the early forest surveys lacked scientific validity, ". . .as < these 
surveys> simply listed certain poorly understood effects in a rather imprecise manner" 
(BIS: 190). On the other hand, the German scientific community supported the precautionary 
approach, and did not come out in opposition to new control measures. 
As far as I can see, the "personal factors" perspective a la the "Thatcher 
style" is less relevant in this case. 
4.3.5. Some special NO, comments 
As the story so far has been very much focused on the "sulfur successes", some special 
comments to the more ambiguous N0,Itransport story seem warranted. According to BIS, 
the car industry adopted successful delaying tactics by demanding a European solution (see 
below). More specifically, the voluntary emission control measures which the government has 
been able to adopt under EC rules may be insufficient, as overall road traffic has been 
growing; the replacement rates of old cars have remained low; and heavy vehicles have 
remained uncontrolled (p.20 1). Hence, the 30 % declaration target seems out of reach. 
However: several economic incentives to retrofitlbuy cleaner cars and petrol were introduced 
in the late 1980s. As among other things the number of low emission cars has increased a bit, 
the protocol stabilization target has quite easily been reached. 
4.3.6. The role of international factors 
As already stated, the basic interest profile of Germany indicates a couple of assumed prime 
motivations for German interplay with its international environment. First, "importing " 
around 50% of its air pollution from its neighbours, Germany could not deal with its pollution 
problems unilaterally. Making others reduce their emissions was quite important. In this 
connection, the EC framework alone was insufficient, as the FRG had some very "dirty" 
Eastern neighbours.. .Moreover, as the ambitious domestically driven abatement program 
outlined above took form, the international, economic competitive dimension of course grew 
stronger. Several German political bodies argued that the government should attempt to 
"spread the misery" of stringent domestic policies to other European partners in order to 
protect German industry against a potential loss of competitiveness (BlS:203). Hence, after 
the "green turn" of 1982 and the strong domestic policies established, both the EC and 
LRTAP must probably be seen more as an arena for exerting influence on Western and 
Eastern neighbours than as international regulatory constraints on domestic policies. The EC 
results have been characterized as a moderate success. For instance, although the LCP 
Directive has been modelled very much on German legislation, the final result was a much 
watered-down compromise. The German efforts have been characterized as more successful 
in the field of European vehicle emissions regulation (BIS, e.g. 203). 
Much more could of course be said about the EC and LRTAP processes, but the main lines 
of conflict and outcomes have already been described in the UK case study. 
4.3.7. Concluding comments 
"Summing up" 
FIRST, WHY A "PROCESS PUSHER" FROM 1982 ON? 
Some important aspects: 
The "focal point" must be the "Waldsterben" crisis in 1981182, which was the main stimulant 
for a major domestic air pollution abatement program. The establishment, design and 
implementation of this program was facilitated by several "benign" societal factors : 
The quite prominent place of regulatory principles like the "Vorsorgelprecautionary " principle 
reduced the weight of scientific uncertainty; 
The importance of "Waldsterben" was amplified by German cultural forest affinity and a 
general greening of the public opinion from the early 1970s on; 
Regional politics and party politics (involving the rise of the Greens) ensured a "favourable" 
leadership in the most important ministries in the crucial early 1980s; 
The private industrial "target groups" were economically successful and perceived as "able 
to pay" ; 
Governmental awareness of and interest in technological abatement opportunities, and the 
more long-term competitive advantages inherent in early application of advanced technology, 
were beneficial factors for regulatory initiatives. 
SECOND, WHY A HIGH LRTAP COMPLIER UP TO 1990/91? 
Some important aspects : 
In a cost-benefit perspective: although damage reductions and hence "benefits" became 
somewhat more uncertain from the mid 1980s on (as the causes of forest damages got more 
complicated), the specific implementation costs were close to zero, due to the program(s) 
referred to above; 
The German LRTAP NO, performance was very much of an externality of EC policy 
processes, which again were rooted in German policy initiatives related to the wider 1982183 
abatement program. 
"Some further comments to the knowledge situation " 
Also in this case, there seem to be few actual conflictual implementation assessments so far. 
In fact, a main comment seems to be that we know quite a lot with regard to wider, "initial" 
factors in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but far less about the actual policy and 
implementation processes after 1985 and 1988. E.g. WahlISprinz refer only to the various 
legislation originally adopted in the early 1980s in order to account for FRG's fulfilment of 
the 1988 NO, protocol. It may very well be that German implementation is more of a 
straight-forward phenomenon than in many other more "unruly" societies, but this remains 
very much of an open question. But it is of course also the case that it is harder to get a grip 
on processes that are very close in time and perhaps still on-going. Still, my impression is 
that we still lack some basic implementation knowledge in the German case. 
More generally, with regard to the access perspective, the challenge also related to Germany 
would be more a matter of piecing together existing information and doing some limited 
interviewing, partly with some key authors, than having to dig up very much new material. 
4.4. The Dutch story: "process broker" and "solid complier".  . 
4.4.1. A rough overview of the knowledge situation 
As far as I know, much less has been written about the Dutch acid rain policies than the two 
important states discussed so far. Dutch policies have been more generally commented upon 
by Levy (1993). This summary is mainly based on Raadschelders (1994); Dinkelman et.al. 
(1994); and Liefferink (1995). 
4.4.2. The LRTAP compliance picture to be explained. 
In the LRTAP protocol negotiations, the impression is that the Netherlands has functioned 
much as a generally positive country (e .g. a 40 % member of the 1984 " 30 % " sulfur club), 
but not a very significant "pusher"; tending rather to play its general role of a middle-country 
"process broker". 
With regard to the sulfur process, the Netherlands ended up as a solid complier, having 
reduced emissions with approx. 66 % by 1993. 
The NO, stabilization target has also been reached, as emissions were reduced with 5% by 
1993. Hence, the Dutch and for instance Norwegian performance so far is quite similar. 
However, in relation to the 30% declaration target, progress is not very impressive. For what 
it is worth, the projected reductions by the year 2000 (the declaration target date is 1998) are 
of the order of 60%. 
Let us then turn to the background for this quite solid performance. 
4.4.3. The "national interests" perspective. 
Point of departure: according to the LRTAP 1994 review, the amount of SO2 emitted in 1980 
was 490 000 tons - three times as much as for instance Norway, but only around 15 % of the 
German figure. So far, I have not come across statistics showing the relative contribution of 
power plants in relation to for instance various industrial combustion processes. With regard 
to the Dutch sulfur and nitrogen "export-import" balance, around 80% of the emissions is 
"exported", and roughly the same amount is "imported" (Liefferink, 1995 : 70). Hence, the 
overall situation is roughly similar to that of Germany. 
Let us then discuss the cost-benefit picture, as imaginably assessed by the government. On 
the basis of Raadschelders (1994), it seems reasonable to assume that the government came 
to see economic benefits as higher than economic compliance costs. Regarding these "issue- 
specific" costs, they were economically not very significant, due to changes in energy policies 
undertaken for other reasons. The keyword is natural gas. The Groningen natural gas field 
was discovered in 1959, and a gradual conversion to natural gas became possible. Towards 
the mid-1970s, almost 90% of electricity was produced with natural gas as a fuel (Dinkelman 
et.al., 1994). The oil crisis in 1973-74 infused "negative" political energy into this process, 
as a gas-rationing policy was developed, related to a wider EC process. As a result of this, 
the government did not renew the contract with the gas producers in 1978. Partly due to 
financial problems in the early 1980s and the Dutch government missing the natural gas 
income, a new contract with the power stations was undertaken, and the conversion process 
was "back on track". Hence, in 1985, the use of fuel oil for electricity generation was only 
a fifth of the total fuel package compared to the figures from 1981 (Raadshelders, 1994:6). 
However: Raadschelders indicates that the Dutch government and the provinces also carried 
out some more directly "environmental" reduction measures in the 1970s, by lowering the 
sulfur content of heavy fuel and strengthening emission standards for oil and coal more 
generally. But according to Dinkelman et.al. (1994:35), Dutch abatement policy was based 
on the strategy that oil refineries and energy intensive industries - sectors that produced for 
international markets - should be spared as much as possible. 
With regard to perceived reductions in environmental damage costs, this factor increased in 
importance related to a rapidly changing more serious picture of acid rain damages towards 
the mid-1980s. According to Raadshelders, problems of air pollution and smog had been on 
the agenda since the late 1950s (p.6). But as noted by Liefferink, policies were mainly 
directed at the local, urban environment (p.74). As late as 1982, effects of acidification were 
reported in Dutch soils poor in calcium, but "as a whole the situation was not seen as 
alarming" (Liefferink, 1995 :75). However, both Raadschelders and Liefferink indicate some 
kind of a turning point around 1983184, as "events in Germany and the actions taken by the 
German government were extremely influential in the Netherlands" (Raadschelders, 1994). 
In 1984, the Central Forest Service published a report which stated that between 20 and 40% 
of the Dutch forests were affected by acid rain (Raadschelders, 1994:4). 
Moreover, it is also indicated that a strong Dutch sulfur policy was seen as "cooperatively" 
beneficial, as the Netherlands was an importer of SO2 and dependent on others' reductions 
for optimal improvements. 
4.4.4. The "domestic politics" perspective 
Briefly setting the stage, among the most important social actors in this connection have been 
the Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and the Environment (VROM), established in 
connection with the Air Pollution Act in 1970; the Ministry of Economic Affairs; the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Fisheries; and the provinces. With regard to 
the governmental structure, it should be noted that the national government had no legal 
authority to set emissions standards until 1981; this was done by the provinces - in 
consultation however with the government. 
According to Raadschelders, the Dutch sulfur story is one characterized by little social 
conflict: "There appears to be no record or memory of fierce competition, negotiation and 
reluctant acceptance of measures. There were certainly distinct positions, but the extreme 
standpoints that one may expect from such diverse actors as environmental interest groups and 
oil refining industries were mediated by the position of the government which was strong and 
united" (p. 15). Why such "social harmony"? The availability of natural gas, which has 
represented a clean and profitable alternative to coal and fuel oil, is probably the most 
important factor. However, Raadschelders also points to the early seizure of the issue by the 
government and the strong support for action within the government. She indicates that this 
early "activism" may have something to do with the upholding of a generally green reputation 
and related influential position in regional and international environmental politics (p. 16). 
With regard to "regulatory philosophies", the section above points towards a "consensual" 
model. Several factors bolster such a thesis. Generally, the political culture in the Netherlands 
has been characterized as a "consensus and consultation" culture, which is "as old the 
Netherlands itself" (Dinkelman et.al., 1994:3). A specific example is the composition of the 
advisory "Central Council for Environmental Hygiene" (CRMH). This council included both 
the Electricity Generating Board (SEP) and the Foundation for Nature and the Environment. 
Another example is the "voluntary agreements" approach. In 1990, a voluntary emissions 
reductions agreement between the national government, the provinces and the Electricity 
Generating Board (SEP) was established. Targets were included, but SEP could determine 
how emissions reductions were to be achieved. This approach has seemingly been successful; 
energy producers agreed to 85% reductions, but have achieved over 90% (Raatschelders, 
1994: 10). 
Winding up this section, it should be repeated, however, that this is only a brief glimpse of 
the sulfur process. Based on the other case studies summed up in this report, my guess is that 
the NO, domestic politics story is somewhat more "controversial". . . 
4.4.5. International factors 
With regard to international factors, as indicated above, Raadschelders emphasizes first and 
foremost the role of Germany. According to Dinkelman et.al. (1994: 15), acidification became 
an issue in the Netherlands some months after the Spiegel article on "Waldsterben" in 1981; 
"till that time Dutch air pollution policy was based on health problems and short term 
transport of air pollution". 
The exact role of LRTAP seems to be somewhat disputed. Raadschelders states that "the 
Dutch case of implementing an SO2 emission policy can be presented with virtually no 
mention of the international environmental agreements" (p. 13). Levy (1993) states that "All 
of the governments - <among them the Netherlands, JW > - were active in < LRTAP > 
collaborative programs, even though their official positions, initially, were that acidification 
was not a problem. Once these governments became aware of the extent of damage their 
countries suffered, they adopted positions favoring reductions in emissions" (p.121). 
However, also Raadschelders' interviewees stated that LRTAP was important (especially the 
exchange of data on depositions), but still: only secondarily so (p. 13). According to her, the 
Dutch were ahead of the international agreements with more stringent measures, and the 
international goals were already in force in the Netherlands. Moreover, as indicated above, 
the "setting a good example" argument was clearly a part of the Dutch policy, but it is highly 
unclear if this aspect has been strong enough to lead to a similar compliance record in a more 
"malign" energy policy situation. 
4.4.6. Summing up 
There seems to be not very much written on Dutch LRTAP implementation processes; 
available information focuses first and foremost on the sulfur process. Based on scattered 
evidence available so far, how account for the solid sulfur compliance record? Some 
important points: first, "specific" costs of achieving the 30% target were low or possibly non- 
existent, as substantial reductions in relation to 1980 levels had been achieved already in 
1985. The use of natural gas, which was more generally financially motivated, was a key 
factor in this picture. But there was also a more general policy drive with regard to the 
establishment of sulfur reduction measures. This process seems to have been more 
"externally" oriented than "internally" driven, as a high degree of domestic environmental 
consensus seems to have existed. Important motivations seem to have been the need for 
setting a good example and influencing others, as much air pollution was "imported", and 
generally strengthening the Dutch "regional environmental (super)power" ambitions. 
4.5. The Norwegian story: a strong, initial "process pusher" getting into 
trouble.. . 
4.5.1. A rough overview of the knowledge situation 
With regard to LRTAP implementation knowledge, the Norwegian situation is more similar 
to the "scarce" Dutch situation than the two other (and in several ways more important) 
countries in this report. Hence, this section is mainly based on Laugen (1995), supplemented 
by Stenstadvold (1991) and various material published by the Norwegian environmental 
authorities 
4.5.2. The LRTAP compliance picture to be explained. 
With regard to Norway's negotiating positions and role in the two main processes focused 
here, much of course related to its position as a clear "net importer" of pollution and with 
vulnerable soil characteristics, Norway was a strong pusher in the process leading up to the 
1979 Convention and the ensuing sulfur regulation process. Initially a proponent also for a 
NO, agreement, over time, Norway's role became more low-key and hesitant, due to an 
increasing awareness of the costs and complications related to abatement efforts in this field. 
Within the sulfur process, Norway has ended up as a very solid complier, having reduced its 
emissions with approx. 74% by 1993. 
The NO, stabilization target has also been reached, as emissions were reduced with around 
5% by 1993. However, as in the Dutch case, in relation to the 30% declaration target, 
progress is not very impressive. Moreover, the Minister of Environment has on several 
occasions indicated that the target may be unattainable. 
With regard to the more recent VOC protocol, Norway has chosen 1989 as base year for the 
30% reduction and has exempted the area north of the 62nd parallel. VOC emissions have 
not been reduced so far; in fact, such emissions had increased 12% by 1993. However, it 
should of course be kept in mind that the target year is 1999. 
4.5.3. The "national interests" perspective. 
Point of departure: according to the LRTAP 1994 review, the amount of SO2 emitted in 1980 
was 142 000 tons, e.g. a little more than Switzerland, but more than three times less than 
Sweden. Moreover, the amount of NO, emitted in 1987 was 237 000 tomes. With regard to 
the relative contribution of the various societal sectors in the case of sulfur, 1990 figures 
indicate that industrial processes accounted for 56%, combustion for energy purposes 23 % 
and mobile sources 22%. In the case of NO,, the figures are: mobile sources 37 % , various 
sea transport and mobile rigs 35%, and combustion for energy purposes and industrial 
processes 23 % . Regarding the Norwegian sulfur and nitrogen "export-import" balance, 
Norway is of course a large net importer of air pollution, with as much as 95 % of total SO2 
fallout and 86% of total NO, fallout imported. 
As can be recalled, within the sulfur context, Norway is a very solid complier, ending up 
with emission reductions more than double the requirements in the 1985 protocol. What is 
the background, then, for this solid record? 
Turning first to the "interest-based" explanatory perspective, the governmental cost-benefit 
calculations in this case seem quite unambiguous. With regard to costs, it seems reasonable 
to distinguish between "pure" domestic abatement costs and the international, competitive 
effects related to the domestic efforts. According to Laugen (1995), the abatement costs 
directly related to the question of compliance were close to zero. The 30% reduction was 
already achieved at the signing of the 1985 protocol. This was primarily due to reductions 
achieved in connection with an industrial clean-up program initiated back in 1974, motivated 
by local air pollution. In addition, some of the reduced emissions from industry came about 
due to a general recession period and closing down of factories. There have of course been 
abatement costs related to the "extra" abatement, but they were probably not very high. For 
instance, the closing of the copper mines in Sulitjelma came after the mines had been highly 
unprofitable and dependent on government subsidies for years. Moreover, 40% of the 1980- 
93 reduction was related to decreasing consumption of heavy crude oil on land. This 
decreasing consumption came about due to a complex interplay between new developments 
in refining technology and governmental regulation. In addition, as some of the emissions 
reductions witnessed have been related to industrial regulation (how much exactly is hard to 
say, but around 20% can be indicated), there was a moderate international competitive 
dimension present. 
Turning to benefits, as indicated earlier, I find it reasonable to distinguish between, on the 
one hand, reductions in environmental damage costs, and on the other hand, strengthening 
of the international "green" reputation. With regard to the more general question of damage 
costs related to acidification, they have been related to fresh-water fishing effects, forest 
damage, damages to human health, and corrosion. For instance yearly loss due to 
acidification of watercourses has been estimated to be around 600 million Norwegian kroner 
(Laugen, 1995:28). However, with regard to reductions in environmental damage costs 
related to domestic abatement, these were of course quite marginal - given that around 95 % 
of SO2 fall-out came from foreign sources. Hence, the bulk of the benefits related to own, 
solid reduction performance must be assumed to have been related to a strengthening of 
Norway's position internationally to call upon others to reduce their emissions. 
On the whole, a picture emerges of a sulfur calculus where the decisive factors were more 
low costs than certain, high benefits. 
So far the sulfur picture. What about the NO, picture, then? Well, here the situation was 
quite different. No specific measures had been introduced before signing of the protocol, and 
emissions were increasing. Abatement costs were bound to be substantial, not least in relation 
to the 30% Declaration target. This has in recent years been demonstrated amply by the intra- 
bureaucratic controversy and delays related to the nitrogen and C 0 2  abatement policy package 
(come back to that). The measures that have been implemented are requirements on exhaust 
gas from all types of vehicles, and industrial measures related to fertilizer production in the 
Grenland area. Other processes and measures which have contributed to the Norwegian NO, 
performance are reduced production in the ferroalloy industry and reduced flaring in the 
North Sea (SFT - "Emissions to Air in Norway", 1993 :7).  
The NO, damage side picture does not deviate very much from the sulfur picture (although 
NO, is not an entirely harmful substance). Moreover, much like in the case of sulfur, 
regarding reductions in environmental damage costs related to domestic abatement, these were 
quite marginal - given that around 85% of NO, fall-out came from foreign sources. Hence, 
also in this case, the bulk of the benefits related to own substantial reduction performance, 
must be assumed to have been related to a possible strengthening of Norway's position 
internationally to call upon others to reduce their emissions. 
On the whole, a picture emerges of a NO, calculus with quite substantial abatements costs 
on the one side - if significant emissions reductions were to take place; and somewhat 
uncertain benefits on the other side - benefits highly dependent on international action. 
4.5.4. The "domestic politics" perspective. 
"The sulfur picture" 
Regarding relevant actors, a first thing to note is the seemingly very centralized decision- 
making process related to the sulfur protocol. Preparations and negotiations were almost 
entirely in the hands of the ministry of environment (and with a centralized intra-ministerial 
process also..), in collaboration with a group of natural scientists. Other ministries were 
mainly informed about the course of the negotiations. 
With regard to regulatory aspectslphilosophies, the Norwegian approach is on the one hand 
a quite centralized one, with regulation of industrial emissions by individual concessions 
decided upon by the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (SFT). This has been 
supplemented by a financial assistance program initiated in 1975 ("Measures against 
pollution", St.meld. nr.44 (1975-76)). 
On the other hand, there is also a tradition of close cooperation between the governmental 
authorities and their respective societal sectors (Laugen, ibid.:69). 
Turning to the question of the inter-governmentallinter-ministerial power balance, as indicated 
above, the process was from the beginning a very centralized and "narrow" one, very much 
dominated by the Ministry of Environment. The lack of interest and intervention from other 
ministries is of course related to the lack of obvious new "specific" costs related to the 
implementation of the 1985 protocol. For instance industrial air pollution regulation had 
started long before the protocol and developed according to its already established logic. 
With regard to the role of target groups, industry representatives were sceptical, but in the 
end quite indifferent, due to state funding programs related to the aforementioned on-going 
more general industrial clean-up program (Laugen, 1994:42). 
Regarding the role of "interested thirds", first, the role of scientists was initially 
controversial, related to the controversy surrounding the "Acid Rain's Effects on Forests and 
Fish" research project (Roll Hansen, 1986). However, this was sorted out, and a good 
working relationship between researchers and environmental authorities was established from 
the early 1980s on. Second, the role of NGOs and the wider public opinion had a distinct 
centrally governed flavour to it. For instance an Information Group Against Acid Rain was 
established in 1982 as a joint project between five NGOs, receiving most of its financing from 
the Ministry of Environment (Laugen, 1995:41). 
In sum, although the domestic politics story provides nuances and analytical richness, the 
basic story in this context is the one provided by the "national interests" perspective - very 
much shaping the form of the domestic politics process. 
"Is NO, diferent ? " 
The NO, issue is of course different in several respects. As already indicated, the Norwegian 
initial "pusher" position changed during the protocol negotiations into a more moderate, 
middle-ground position (Stenstadvold, 1991). This change was due to a recognition of a more 
complicated domestic emissions situation than initially assumed, with among other things 
higher shipping emissions than initially realized. Hence, the Norwegian Labour government 
only reluctantly joined the smaller group of countries signing the 30% declaration, probably 
pressured by a domestic party-political green contest with regard to reduction targets (with 
the agricultural Center Party going for a 75% NO, reduction by the year 2000.. .), and a 
general surge in the public's interest in green issues at the time (Laugen, 1995:42-43). But 
it had become clear already during the protocol negotiations that fulfilling the 30% target 
would necessarily mean new and probably costly policy measures. 
Related to the talk of new and costly abatement measures, and of course also to some extent 
given by the more complex NO, emission picture, new and other ministerial actors were 
drawn to this process compared to the sulfur process. 
In the first major process aiming for a plan to achieve the 30% target (up to October 1991), 
important potential implementing agencies like the Ministries of Transport and Energy and 
the Directorate of Shipping and Navigation were involved, in addition to the Ministry of 
Environment. In the second major process, an interministerial committee has been at work, 
consisting of the ministries of Environment, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, Transport 
and Communication, Industry and Energy. The seemingly complicated committee work has 
been aptly described by Laugen (1995): "On one hand the Ministry of Environment has 
argued that Norway needs to fulfil its international obligations in order to legitimately expect 
the same from others. On the other hand, the Ministry of Finance has resisted more 
government spendings, the Ministry of Transport has resisted measures to reduce traffic, the 
Ministry of Energy has resisted measures towards oil-production and the Directorate of 
Shipping has resisted regulation of coastal traffic" (p.50). The committee work has finally 
been finished (St.meld.41 (1994-95)), and the plan contains few new regulatory initiatives. 
Emissions are expected to be reduced 8% by the year 2000. 
Hence, as indicated above, target groups have indirectly and directly become involved in the 
process in a quite different and more active manner than the sulfur process. This has of 
course to do with the fact that mobile sources are not covered by Pollution Control Act, 
hence leaving the various ministries in charge of possible measures within their sectors, and 
the Ministry of Environment in a difficult brokering and coordinating role. 
With regard to the role of NGOs and the media, they have also become more interested in 
this bureaucratic infighting and followed the process critically. However, one cannot say that 
this has been a major issue in public debate, and interest in environmental issues has 
generally decreased towards the mid-1990s. The green party-political contest of the target- 
formulating midllate 1980s is long gone.. . 
In sum, is then this higher degree of implementation complexity - with far more actors 
involved than in the case of SO2 - the main explanation for comparatively much lower NO, 
implementation "effectiveness" (although formal compliance has been achieved)? Some 
coordination problems and internal conflicts seem to have existed, but the keyword seems to 
be costs - and a situation where costs will fall on fairly specific target groups which are both 
powerful and exposed to tough international competition (cf. shipping), and benefits are 
widely dispersed. 
4.5.5. The question of international factors. 
Turning to the question of international factors, first, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
regime had virtually nothing to do with formal SO2 compliance; the achievement of the 30% 
reduction was seemingly related to domestic processes with their roots years before even the 
1979 Convention. However, the existence of the regime as a channel and forum for 
persuasion and pressure may contribute to explaining the degree of "over-compliance". In 
other words, the better one did domestically, the louder one could call for others to follow 
suit. Moreover, other aspects point clearly in the direction of LRTAP as an important 
international instrument for NorwegiantScandinavian persuasion and pressure. This is first and 
foremost related to knowledge development; Norway needed to bolster both long-distance 
transportation and related domestic damage theses. The EMEP program (Cooperative 
Program for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of Air Pollutants 
in Europe) played a crucial role in the transportation debate. This program was initiated by 
the OECD in the late 1970s, and expanded within the LRTAP framework (as mentioned, a 
specific EMEPILRTAP protocol was signed in 1984). As indicated by Laugen, most Western 
European countries were sceptical of the Scandinavian claim that their countries caused 
damage far away from the sources, but by the early 1980's the scientific evidence was 
compelling, and this part of the debate was more or less over. With regard to domestic 
damage research, Norwegian participation in LRTAP working groups may have been helpful, 
and LRTAP functioned as a forum for presenting results (Laugen, 1995:62). 
However, the NO, story indicates the limited power of international commitments when the 
going gets tough. True, the need to preserve a Norwegian green reputation within LRTAP 
may have played a role for the acceptance of the 30% NO, declaration target (although the 
declaration is not formally a part of the LRTAP system). This aspect may also have 
influenced the general level of governmental attention given to NO,-reducing measures - even 
if this attention has had limited practical results so far. Moreover, as far as I can see, it is 
somewhat uncertain whether Norway would have stabilized its NO, emissions without the 
NO,-protocol and its "green" LRTAP reputation in the background - given increasing 
emissions (and "increase" predictions) in the years before the protocol, and its "large NO, 
importer" geographical position. However: there is no doubt that domestic forces and 
processes are the main explanatory factors for the NO, implementation story so far. 
Summing up: as indicated by Laugen (1995), Norwegian LRTAP-related SO2 politics is 
definitely not a reluctant compliance story, but much better described as an active strategy 
towards creating international agreements and influencing important "exporter" states through 
knowledge and the setting of a good example. Hence, LRTAP may have played a certain role 
for the degree of over-compliance witnessed. But as indicated earlier, much was clearly 
achieved by "coincidental" processes and measures with a purely domestic background. The 
need to preserve a Norwegian green reputation within LRTAP may also have played a role 
for the acceptance of the 30% NO, declaration target. However, the NO, story indicates the 
limited power of international commitments when implementation gets economically and 
politically costly. 
4.5.6. Concluding comments. 
How, then, account for the sulfur "over-compliance" and the comparatively much lower NO, 
implementation "effectiveness" (although formal compliance has been achieved)? 
In the case of sulfur, compliance with the 30% reduction requirement was achieved already 
when Norway signed the protocol, and much of the further emissions reductions have been 
caused by more or less coincidental, "non-environmental" processes like the closing of 
unprofitable copper mines and developments in refining technology. Some of this over- 
compliance may have been inspired by a wish to boost Norway's international "pusher" 
position, but most of the reductions would probably have taken place anyway. 
The NO, situation is quite different, as no measures had been undertaken before the signing 
of the international commitments. Moreover, the more diffuse and complex (and definitely 
economically important) transport and shipping sectors were important "target sectors", and 
substantial emissions reductions would be costly. Weak regulatory powers left the Ministry 
of Environment in a complicated and protracted bargaining situation with the other sector 
agencies, in which it has not had much success so far. As the stabilization and minor 
emissions reductions achieved so far have been caused by measures primarily motivated by 
local pollution problems, the impact of international commitments has not been very marked. 
But it is questionable if the intra-bureaucratic battle would have been started at all if the 
various international NO, commitments had not been established. 
Overall: thanks to Laugen's (1995) work, we know a great deal about Norwegian 
implementation processes. However, among other things, the intriguing NO, bureaucratic 
infighting lies very much in the dark. 
5. Focusing in on the Importance of Regime Design 
5.1. The perspective introduced 
In this section, I turn the country-specific, "individualistic" and "bottom-up" perspective more . 
or less around and adopt a more international, "holistic" and "top-down" perspective. In other 
words, from being a member of the "explanatory choir", the regime moves centre stage. 
Given the case study information specifically focused here and other empirical material, what 
do we know about the importance of the various aspects of the LRTAP regime design? It is 
of course debatable what constitutes the most important elements in the design of international 
regimes. My list is based on work within the "Oslo/Seattle" effectiveness project, and the 
background for it further discussed in AndreserdSkjaerseth/Wettestad (1995) and Wettestad 
(1995 A). Basically, I suggest to distinguish between "structural" and "regulative" aspects of 
regimes. Six structural factors may be discerned: participatiordaccess; the role of the agenda; 
decision-making rules; the role of the secretariat; the organization of the scientific-political 
complex; verification and compliance mechanisms. Regulative aspects may be discussed on 
the background of keywords such as " "legal status", "specificity" and "differentiation". In 
addition to the structural and regulative regime perspectives, there is also a more "diffuse" 
regime perspective, highlighting the confidence-building effect of cooperation over time, and 
perhaps not related to any specific design element of regimes. I will come back to that. 
5.2. The "structural" regime perspective 
5.2.1. Access and participation: an open process of "mutual education"? 
"Conceptual background" 
I would argue that at least three different dimensions/"faces" of regime participation are 
discernible: state access/"scope" ; "outsiders' access" ; and "level". With the term scope, I am 
referring to the question of whether the regime is global, regional or bilateral with regard to 
state participation. An important suggested perspective here: in order to achieve problem- 
solving effectiveness, participatory scope should match problem scope quite closely. For 
instance, an "OECD climate regime" would not at all be insignificant, but we know that 
(especially over time) Third World - and global - participation will be crucial in order to 
deal with the greenhouse problem. But flexibility may also be important: especially in 
comprehensive/global settings, it seems obviously reasonable, in certain phases and related 
to certain more limited problems within a larger whole, to temporarily limit participation and 
conduct work in smaller groups, perhaps shielded from public attention. 
Access for outsiders has to do with the rules regulating the participation of actors "outside" 
the formal regime parties: observers from other regimes/organizations, private-sector 
organizations, environmental NGOs etc. 
A general assumption here may be that open access, practised however with some flexibility 
(as general openness in negotiations can also easily lead to "play for gallery" etc.), is an 
effective approach. 
The level aspect of regimes has to with the extent to which important regime meetings are 
dominated by ministers/politicians or administrators/bureaucrats. A general assumption may 
be that regular "high level"/political gatherings can contribute sorely-needed political energy 
into regime negotiation processes, given the existence of continuous bureaucratic "footwork" 
and follow-up". 
"The LRTAP picture so far" 
As a general comment, not surprisingly, most attention in the literature so far has been given 
to the question of outsiders' access. 
But let us first turn to the question of state participation. There seem to be some differences 
in "coverage" between the protocols. For instance, the 1985 sulfur protocol has had 21 
Parties, with among others the US and the UK as non-parties; while the 1988 NO, protocol 
has had 25 Parties, including both the US and the UK. The new sulfur protocol has been 
signed by 28 Parties. These differences may have influenced and at least may influence 
problem-solving effectiveness somewhat, as it means an improving match between problem- 
creating activities and international mitigatory measures over time. This is especially related 
to the fact that important emitters like the UK and Poland are now members of the new sulfur 
protocol. However, with regard to "political" effectiveness, they are of questionable 
importance. All groups are probably too large to develop a very strong "diffuse" reciprocity, 
but this "cooperative culture" question has not been systematically addressed so far. 
With regard to the question of "outsiders' access", this question has so far only been quite 
generally commented upon. Regarding the LRTAP formal access structure, the 1979 Protocol 
only contained a very general formulation in article 10, saying that the Executive Body could 
"when it deems appropriate, also make use of information from other relevant international 
organizations". In practice, LRTAP meetings have been open to IGOs, industrial groups and 
environmental NGOs. In contrast to e.g. the North Sea cooperation, also working group 
meetings are open to NGOs - as long as they have "consultative status" with the ECE. The 
NGOs are allowed to participate in discussions, but rarely do that. The only "closed" fora 
within the LRTAP regime are the Heads of Delegations meetings in negotiation processes 
(Nordberg , LRTAP secr., May 1995). 
Hence, what has been coined a LRTAP process of "mutual education" (Sand, 1990:256) has 
meant the participation of IGOs like the World Meteorological Organization (Nordberg: 
important), World Health Organization (Nordberg: more important over time), UNEP and 
FA0 (Nordberg : seldom), OECD, and the International Energy Agency. With regard to 
industrial groups, we have groups such as CONCAWE (Oil Companies European 
Organization for Environmental and Health Protection). Turning finally to NGOs, active 
participants have been the British branches of Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth; the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature; the International Council on 
Environmental Law; and not least the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA) . 
Hence, we have a pretty good picture of who has participated at the international level more 
generally. Less is clear with regard to patterns in the specific processes and development over 
time: does "inclusiveness" vary between the different processes? Has "inclusiveness" 
increased over time, and with any effects? And far less is known about the specific 
eflectslimpact of this participation on negotiation outcomes and implementation processes. 
Levy (ibid.) generally states that "except for IIASA, none of these groups have much 
influence over LRTAP decision-making. The influence of NGOs comes mainly via activities 
inside countries, usually publicizing governmental action within LRTAP". This might very 
well be so, but we need to substantiate this assessment with data both from the international 
and national level. 
Regarding the level of proceedings, first, due to the reoccurring protocol negotiations at quite 
regular intervals (around 3-4 years), LRTAP cooperation has been marked by interplay 
between bureaucraticlmore low profile and politicallhigh profile processes. However, it may 
be suggested that the LRTAP process was perhaps infused with somewhat more "political 
energy" in the early phases of the cooperative process than in the more recent phases, due 
to closely related high level meetings like the Stockholm Conferences in 1982 and the Munich 
and Ottawa meetings in 1984. 
5.2.2. Decision-making rules - is consensus better than its reputation ? 
"Conceptual background" 
As a general point of departure, it seems here reasonable to assume that majority-voting is 
a stronger decision-making rule than consensus. The case for majority voting is well known, 
but let us repeat the main logic. In situations where decision-rules demand unanimity, a single 
"laggard" state may be able to hinder a vast majority of states agreeing to a regulation. 
Moreover, it has been suggested that "vetoing", i.e. finding flaws (for instance costs falling 
on specific groups and in the near future) related to international regulations, is far easier in 
international cooperation than "engineering", i.e. convincingly portraying the (often diffuse 
and long-term) benefits related to such regulations (Underdal, 1989, 1990). Thus, the 
decision-rule of unanimity does in a way "structurally" favour the "laggards". Any 
institutional ability to go beyond this "laggards logic" must surely be assumed to enhance 
problem-solving capacity. 
"The LRTAP picture" 
Turning to LRTAP, as a general comment, I have not seen any discussions of this aspect of 
LRTAP decision-making, so the following are my own reflections. 
Point of departure: article 12 in the 1979 Convention stated that amendments to the 
Convention should be adopted by consensus, and enter into force "for the Contracting Parties 
which have accepted it on the ninetieth day after the date on which two-thirds of the 
Contracting Parties have deposited their instruments of acceptance with the depositary". 
Hence, the basic decision rule also within this regime has been unanimity. The immediate 
reflection is that this obviously has reduced the "strength" of the outputs and hence the course 
of the cooperation. But this question is perhaps not as obvious as it may seem at first glance. 
First, it is questionable if there in any of the negotiation processes carried out so far has been 
a majority for a much stronger output. To my knowledge, for instance in connection with the 
1985 sulfur negotiations, there were never any serious discussions of a 50 or 60 percent cut. 
In fact, I have never heard of anything other than the 30% suggestion in connection with 
these negotiations. Regarding the NO, negotiations, there was a "splinter" group forming the 
30% declaratory cut, but I doubt whether it would have been possible to get a majority 
behind a legally binding protocol on 30% NO, cuts. I do not think for instance that Norway 
would have signed such a protocol. Related to all this is also, second, the possibility of 
establishing protocols without the consent of all Convention Parties. Hence, the consensus 
requirement has been practised with some flexibility. For instance in connection with the 
establishment of the 1985 sulfur protocol, the majority of the Parties secured a formal 
acceptance from the "outsider" UK. Third, it is generally questionable whether majority- 
voting rules are implemented as carefully as consensus decisions. However, this is a subject 
which can be pursued empirically first and foremost within the European Union context. 
5.2.3. The role of the secretariat: stage-hand or actor? 
"Conceptual background" 
As noted by Sandford (1992, 1994), available literature on secretariats focuses mainly on the 
U.N. Secretary-General in international negotiations and crises of various kinds. Other 
secretariats, such as those related to international environmental regimes, have hitherto 
received far more scattered attention. As far as I can see, the most focused analytical 
distinction in the literature on secretariats so far is the distinction between "active"/ 
"maximalist" and "passive"/"minimalist"/stage-hand secretariats (see for instance Young, 
1967). For instance, regarding agenda-setting, the "activist" secretariat initiates and actively 
participates in agenda setting and protocol development. The "passive" secretariat acts more 
as a behind-the-scenes adviser on agenda. In the negotiation stage, the "activist" secretariat 
consults with the parties about negotiation requirements, facilitates, and in some cases 
initiates, the development of parallel or single negotiating texts. It is also available to act as 
moderator or mediator in the case of negotiation stalemates. A "passive" secretariat does not 
participate directly in the negotiations, instead it provides administrative assistance to the 
parties in document preparation as requested (Sandford, 1992). 
It may be argued that the other main interesting dimension to scrutinize further is the question 
of "resources", in terms of budgetary resources and manpower. In my view, there is no 
logical necessity for an active secretariat to be a large secretariat - or the other way around. 
It might very well be that the "optimal" combination is a rather small secretariat (not drawing 
on more than "necessary" of the Parties' resources), being "active" and efficient. But this of 
course also has to do with the Parties' own administrative resources: the weaker these are, 
the stronger the assumed need for the international secretariat's resources. 
"The LRTAP picture" 
As a general comment, the role and strength of the LRTAP secretariat have for instance been 
commented upon by Wettestad (1991) and Levy (1993). 
Compared to other international regimes with "their own" administrative units, like for 
instance the PARCON secretariat, the LRTAP secretariat is a somewhat different formal 
creature. LRTAP secretariat functions have been provided by the Air Pollution Section of the 
ECE's Environment and Human Settlements Division. Hence, LRTAP secretarial functions 
were added to an existing institution's agenda. In terms of resources, the LRTAP secretarial 
staff has been characterized as "small, overworked and underfunded" (Levy, 1993 : 84). The 
Air Pollution Unit has for a long time had five professional staff members, with two support 
staff members. Perhaps even more than many other international environmental regimes, the 
LRTAP secretariat is weak by design. The reluctancy of the Parties with regard to giving the 
regime organizational clout was symbolized by the unwillingness in 1983 to allocate resources 
to uphold the one post financed so far by UNEP. The argumentation was formal: article 11 
of the Convention requested the Executive Secretary of ECE to carry out secretarial functions 
- and so be it.. . I 4  Allegedly, the secretariat has little or no time for even very modest 
14 See Gehring (1994), p.138. 
entrepreneurial initiatives. Regarding the states' reports, a consciously passive role on behalf 
of the secretariat has been indicated, in order not to embarrass the Parties. For instance, no 
effort has been made to fill in missing information or to correct misleading information in the 
reports (Levy 1993 : 91). Moreover, given for instance the fact that the scientific-political 
complex to serve is definitely comparatively quite complex, this contributes to making a 
passive role highly understandable. Moreover, the LRTAP secretarial resource situation seems 
to have developed even more unfavourably over the years, as new protocols and processes 
have gradually been added to the workload. 
Summing up, there seems to be little doubt that the LRTAP secretariat falls clearly into the 
"stage-hand" category - and even a relatively weak one, resourcewise. However, we seem 
to know less about exactly what this has meant for the cooperative process. 
5.2.4. The role of the agenda: the triumph of sequential decision-making? 
"Conceptual background " 
At the outset, it should be noted that the reasoning related to the role of the agenda is very 
much geared towards the effects on the outputs of conferences and regime meetings, 
reflecting its roots in the negotiation literature. Hence, in an effectiveness context which 
includes national level policy and implementation processes, the causal chain to the structure 
of the agenda becomes indirect and quite long - in a sense, "going through" regime outputs. 
A central keyword in this connection has been "negotiation flexibility", i.e. the possibility of 
adding and subtracting issues and parties (e.g. Sebenius, 1990), in order to avoid 
overwhelming comprehensiveness, but still having the possibility to put together "packages" 
that promise a sufficient joint gain to be attractive to a large number of parties. Moreover, 
Sebenius advises proceeding sequentially with specific agreements/protocols, and pick "easy" 
subjects first. However, it should be noted that the idea of the adding and subtraction of 
issues seem to necessitate a fairly comprehensive agenda in order to be workable (i.e. you 
have to have a "critical" mass of issues in order to subtract and add). 
"The LRTAP picture" 
A first, general reflection is that there is in fact a limited number of negotiation analyses 
which may offer interesting observations in this connection (Jackson, 1990; Gehring, 1994; 
Stenstadvold, 1991 ; Levy, 1993). 
Turning to substance, first, the very loose and open-ended agenda laid out in the LRTAP 
Convention should be noted. This "basic" issue flexibility has been pinpointed as an 
institutional strength: "As a result, although LRTAP was created primarily because of a 
political crisis over Scandinavian lakes and sulfur, it has evolved into a forum for 
coordinating research and policies toward a variety of pollutants (many thought not to present 
transboundary problems in 1979) which threaten a variety of receptors also not thought to be 
at risk in 1979.." (Levy, 1993:llO; see also Sand, 1990:257). More generally, the 
development of the LRTAP agenda may definitely be termed "sequential", with an initial 
focus on 0 2 ,  turning thereafter to the NO, problem, and then on to the VOC problem, before 
the parties returned to SO2 in 1991. On the one hand, this can of course be seen as a 
"rational" ability to decompose a complex "transboundary air pollution problem" into several, 
more manageable problems - dealt with gradually, as knowledge has improved. On the other 
hand, it may also have something to do with interests in the first rounds of protocol 
negotiations. According to Gehring (1992: 142-44), a Central European suggestion to extend 
the proposed sulfur regime to cover also NO, emissions was rejected first and foremost by 
the Nordic countries. However, as the knowledge on the considerable degree of interplay 
between the various pollutants (into "acid cocktails") has increased, the next round of LRTAP 
negotiations - which "naturally", according to practice so far, would be on a new NO, 
protocol - may be on a protocol targeting a broader group of substances than NO, alone. 
Hence, this discussion may indicate a certain frustration with regard to a sequential, "narrow" 
approach among the Parties. However, on the whole, it seems right to say that the Parties so 
far seem to have regarded this more "narrow" negotiating approach, focusing one group of 
substances at a time, as the most effective in this context. This remains to be further 
substantiated, however. 
In addition, an intricate structure of scientific, technical, economic and political working 
groups have seemingly effectively decomposed the undoubtedly comprehensive agenda. In this 
connection, as additional indications of the merits of flexibility, LRTAP has also used smaller 
and more informal workshops focusing on smaller parts of the problems. 
5.2.5. The organization of the science-politics interface: a complex, but copyable model? 
"Conceptual background" 
Several studies indicate that the knowledge production and technology diffusion aspects 
related to the functioning of international resource and environmental regimes are very 
important features indeed. It was for instance concluded in Kay and Jacobson's 1983 book: 
"We are struck.. .by the differential effectiveness of international organizations in cases where 
problem identification is given a clear priority, as contrasted to cases where activity takes 
place in the absence of any such consensus or of a major effort on the part of the secretariat 
concerned to build and maintain a consensus on the nature of the problem" (s. 324). However, 
in my view, what is very much lacking in this discussion so far is a more precise 
identification and assessment of the specific international organizational component in this 
connection. The most notable exception that I am aware of, is the "buffer" thesis launched 
by Ed Miles (1987). Miles found that one of the most important factors in scientific 
consensus-building is the presence or absence of direct distributive and regulatory links, and 
that "indirect rather than direct links to management decisions will facilitate the emergence 
of consensual knowledge " (Miles, 1989: 49). Particularly in situations where the level of 
political conflict is high, direct links to the regulatory body may "contaminate" scientific 
research. But what, more precisely, qualifies as an "organizational buffer", and what does 
not? I would suggest the following operational definition: an organizational science-politics 
"buffer" is a specific, formal body within the cooperation, staffed with administrators with 
some kind of a natural scientific training, and with the mandate of discussing (but not 
deciding on) questions in the science-politics interface. On this background, it may generally 
be assumed that regimes with a scientific-political complex organized along such lines 
function better than regimes with no such buffers. 
Regarding the more specific implementation phase, a different institutional perspective may 
be indicated. Here, a possible pathway of learning and influence from international to national 
processes could be the participation of national scientific/technical bureaucrats in international 
scientific/technical bodies and networks. The logic is that such participation - and related 
interaction with the secretariat - could possibly form the basis of "episteinic communities" 
(e.g. Haas, 1992). In the same manner as such "coalitions" may help create an agreement, 
subsequently they may also divert their energy towards the implementation process. 
"The LRTAP picture" 
A first, general comment may be that the knowledge production system, and especially the 
ENlEP program, has been one of the most commented upon institutional features within the 
LRTAP regime (e.g. Dovland, 1987; Levy, 1993, 1995; Wettestad, 1991, 1995 B). 
Let us first briefly describe the institutional set-up. A first thing to note is that part of the 
LRTAP "scientific-political complex" lingered on from pre-Convention days, namely the 
Working Party on Air Pollution Problems" (WPAP). WPAP was initially under the ECE 
body 'Senior advisers to ECE Governments on Environmental and Water Problems.' Other 
parts of the scientific-political complex grew out of the aforementioned OECD monitoring 
program, namely the EMEP ("Cooperative Program for Monitoring and Evaluation of Long- 
range Transmissions of Air Pollutants in Europe") program. The rest of the complex was 
established in connection with the convention, with sub-groups gradually being added to the 
structure. Up until 1991, the structure was roughly as follows: on the administrative, political 
side, the main bodies have been the "Executive Body" (EB) of the Convention, with the 
parties meeting annually since 1983, and the "Working Group on Abatement Strategies" 
(WGAS), an important forum for continuous negotiations (established in 1989). On the 
scientific/technical side, important subsidiary bodies under the EB have been the "Working 
Group on Effects" (WGE); the Working Group on NO,; the "Working Group on VOCs" 
(WGV); the EMEP Steering Body; the "Group of Economic Experts on Air Pollution" 
(GEAP); and the aforementioned "Working Party on Air Pollution Problems" (WPAP). 
Under these bodies, several "International Cooperative Programs" (ICPs) and Task Forces 
have been established. 
This organizational setup was reorganized in November 1991. The current organizational 
structure is somewhat simpler: on the administrative/political side, in addition to the EB, 
there is now a "Working Group on Strategies" (WGS). On the scientific/technical side, in 
addition to the "Working Group on Effects" (WGE) and the EMEP Steering Body, there is 
now a "Working Group on Abatement Techniques" (WGT). Current International Cooperative 
Programs under the WGE are forests (Germany), freshwaters (Norway), materials (Sweden), 
crops (UK), and integrated monitoring (Sweden). 
The EMEP monitoring program warrants some specific, introductory comments. It was 
initiated by the ECE in cooperation with the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) 
and the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) as a part of UNEP's "Global 
Environment Monitoring System" (GEMS). The main objective of EMEP is to provide 
governments with information on deposition and concentration of pollutants, as well as on the 
quantity and significance of long-range transmission of pollutants. The program has three 
main elements: emission data, measurements of air and precipitation quality, and atmospheric 
dispersion models. The EMEP sampling network consists of some 100 stations in 33 
countries, and the work is coordinated by three international centres, two in Oslo and one in 
Moscow. In 1984, a specific EMEP financing protocol was established. Funding is now 
provided by all Parties to the EMEP Protocol, according to a cost sharing agreement 
developed by the Parties to the Convention on the basis of the UN "assessment scale" (based 
on GNP, population and geographic criteria). 15. The 1995 EMEP budget was around 1,9 
million dollars. 
So: has this organizational model been a successful one? First, related to what was mentioned 
in the section on the agenda, the basic flexibility of the system must be deemed a success. 
As noted by Levy (1993), the fact that LRTAP has been "consistently science- and 
ecosystem-driven" means that working groups have gradually been organized around potential 
environmental damages, and permitted any transfrontier pollutants to enter the diplomatic 
agenda. "This accounts for the ease with which VOCs entered the agenda, as well as for the 
15 Dovland; H . : "Monitoring European Transboundary Air Pollution", Environment, December 
1987; personal communication with L.Nordberg, LRTAP Secretariat. 
current investigations into mercury and persistent organic compounds" (Levy, ibid. : 11 1). 
Second, the "formally advanced" (e.g. financing based on a separate, specific protocol) and 
seemingly well-functioning EMEP system has represented a strong scientific foundation and 
"core" in the development of the regime; compared for instance to regimes like the North Sea 
and ozone, seemingly the best-functioning and most centrally placed monitoring system. 
Third, the other possible organizational difference from other international environmental 
regimes is the permanent negotiating forum, the "Working Group on Strategies". This body 
may be seen as the kind of mediating buffer between science and politics envisaged by Miles - 
a "not too formal" meeting-place for scientists and administrators, allowing the building of 
consensual knowledge on both scientific and political strategic matters. However, this is 
mostly speculative, as we so far only have general descriptions of the functioning of the WGS 
(e.g. Wettestad, 1995 B, "..a coordinating and 'translatory' role, as it cannot fulfil its 
negotiating role without inputs from all the other bodies"). True, there are bodies within other 
regimes which are at least comparable, for instance the former "Technical Working Group" 
within the PARCON regime, but with much less explicit weight given to the 
negotiatinglpolicy aspects. Hence, the functioning of the WGS should be an interesting 
(comparative) topic for further study - in order to further delineate the degree of uniqueness 
of and "success" related to the LRTAP institutional approach. 
5.2.6. Verification and compliance: a unique verification capacity not further utilized? 
"Conceptual background " 
Compared to most of the factors that have been discussed so far, the issues related to 
verification and compliance are clearly geared more towards the implementation phase. But 
as there is a constant interplay between regime meetingslregulatory development and 
implementation processes in most environmental regimes, these issues are of course also 
relevant for regime outputs. Reports of lacking or inadequate implementation will surely not 
exactly bolster the Parties' willingness to strengthen and extend regime regulations.. . 
On the basis of previous and current scholarly attention given to these issues (e.g. Young, 
1979; Chayes and Chayes, 1991, 1993, forthcoming; Victor/Ausubel, 1992; Mitchell, 1994 
A and B; Victor et.al., 1994), it seems also reasonable to assume that these factors are among 
the causally most important institutional factors. Just to pick two examples from the quite 
recent effectiveness literature: Young (1992) suggests that the effectiveness of international 
institutions varies directly with the ease of monitoring or verifying compliance with their 
principal behavioral prescriptions (p. 176). In the same vein: according to HaasIKeohanelLevy 
(1993), "the monitoring activities of international institutions can be vital to the ability of 
states to make and keep agreements" (p.22). I would further suggest distinguishing between 
two main, related issue complexes within this broader field; first, the verification part, related 
to reporting and "checking" of compliance; and second, what may be referred to as 
"compliance strengthening" mechanisms, either "negative" (some form of sanctions) or 
"positive" (for instance economic incentives like compensation funds). 
A rough summary of my interpretation of the knowledge status so far : 
reports on follow-up can be both generally confidence-building and contribute to various 
forms of learning - and through these processes, possibly enhance effectiveness more than 
most other institutional factors. It may generally be assumed that such reports will be most 
trustworthy if they include other sources of information than only the states own reports. The 
need for sanctions can be assumed to be related to factors like regulatory strength and related 
economic/political implications: the closer the international environmental measures get to 
"high politics", the more relevant the discussions and possible use of sanctions. The need for 
"positive" incentives can be assumed to be first and foremost dependent on the heterogeneity 
of the regime parties. 
"The LRTAP picture" 
This aspect of the LRTAP regime has mostly been generally commented upon so far (Sand, 
1990; Levy, 1993; Wettestad et.al., 1991), but more specific studies are under way (di 
Primio, 1996). 
An important point of departure here is that monitoring of state performance has been mainly 
based on the parties' annual reports to the secretariat on emissions and procedures adopted 
for the abatement of emissions and the measurement of acid precipitation. In addition to the 
annual reports, there is a more comprehensive review of national abatement strategies and 
policies every four years. However, what sets LRTAP a little bit apart is a limited capacity 
for additional, "independent" verification. This capacity stems from the EMEP monitoring 
system, based on emission data, measurements of air and precipitation quality, and 
atmospheric distribution models. Referring to the periodic reviews and the EMEP system, 
Sand (1990:259) maintains: "Few other international agreements can be said to come 
equipped with verification instruments of this caliber". However: also the reports of EMEP 
are partly based on national "self-reports"; moreover, some countries have failed to report 
emissions, and monitoring coverage in Southern Europe is seen by EMEP as insufficient 
(Levy 1993:89). But this is a point that certainly warrants further attention, as it is in a way 
the critical test of the extent to which LRTAP really is a "unique" model in terms of 
verification. 
To my knowledge, critical compliance discussions have so far been non-existent. As stated 
by Levy (1993:91): "Strategy and policy reviews are not interpreted; they are simply collated 
and published. There is no effort to ascertain whose measures place them in compliance with 
either specific protocols or broader norms.. .Although no one is ever 'cross-examined', states 
frequently make oral statements offering clarifications and emphasizing major points at EB 
meetings". Hence, the question of sanctions has therefore been uninteresting. Does all this 
mean that the verification instruments "even of this calibre" have been without importance 
for state policies? As far as I can see, this remains to be investigated further. 
It should also be noted that an institutional change is announced in connection with the new 
sulfur protocol. A specific implementation committee is going to be established, with a 
mandate of reviewing implementation and compliance, and including decisions on "action to 
bring about full compliance with the protocol" (art.7). The practical implications are hard to 
evaluate. Within environmental politics, the institutional model has probably been the 
implementation committee established within the ozone-layer regime. However, that 
committee has not functioned long enough to draw any practical conclusions. 
With regard to the "positive" incentive aspects, LRTAP offers no institutional "positive" 
incentives. However, the establishment of some sort of financial mechanism, facilitating 
"burden sharing" in connection with the possible additional abatement costs envisaged for 
meeting "critical loads" in different parts of Europe, is being discussed (Levy, 1995). 
Summing up: if LRTAP has been unique in terms of verification and compliance so far, then 
this must be related to the ENIEP's system capacity for "independent" verification and not 
to the compliance procedures. However, the "real" independence of the EMEP system 
remains to be clarified. Moreover, the actual effects on states' policies of this additional 
verification capacity also remains to be investigated. 
5.3. "Regulative" regime aspects: type of rules. 
"Conceptual background" 
Regimes produce outputs/regulations, which are the most specific and direct points of 
departure for national implementation efforts - but which I think should be seen as primarily 
intermediate variables in relation to more "structural" regime features like access rules and 
decision rules. Building on AndresenISkjaersethlWettestad (1995), I think it is possible to 
discern at least three major dimensions of regime regulatory "strength" : "legal status" ; 
"specificity" ; and "differentiation" . 
Regarding legal status, the main difference is between regulations being legally binding upon 
the states having agreed to them, and regulations having no such binding status - being cast 
in the form of recommendations or political statements of intent. Generally, I would assume 
that states would find it politically more difficult to disregard binding decisions, and hence 
that binding international decisions are implemented more effectively than recommendations. 
Turning to specificity, on the one hand, this has to do with the question whether international 
decisions contain quantitative targets. Another aspect of this is whether such reduction targets 
are to be achieved within specific time-frames. Again, everything else equal, I find it 
reasonable to assume that a specified decision will result in "more" implementation and 
behavioral impact than a more generally worded decision. Among other things, specific 
emission targets and deadlines establish explicit focal points, which make it easier for 
domestic and international watchdogs to intervene in the process. Hence, these aspects are 
probably related to the "verifiability" question. 
Finally, the question of differentiation has to do with the extent to which international regimes 
have different targets and time-lines for different types of actors. The traditional 
environmental agreements have tended to place equal obligations on all parties, irrespective 
of their capacity and ability to implement. Recently, more flexible approaches have been 
suggested, primarily as a means to reach agreement, but it may also affect the process of 
implementation. Such agreements may be perceived more legitimate by otherwise sceptical 
participants, and increase - if not their capacity - at least their possibility and political will 
for subsequent implementation. 
"The LRTAP picture" 
As far as I can see, related aspects have first and foremost been commented upon by Levy 
(1 993). 
Let us first sum up the development over time. Turning first to the 1979 Convention, it is 
definitely binding, but its specificity is low, generally talking about the "limitation and 
gradual reduction and prevention" of transboundary air pollution. 
Moving on to the 1985 sulfur protocol, it is also binding, but with higher specificity, 
including both the 30% reduction target and the 1993 time-limit. Flexibility is naturally 
lower. The 30% target has been characterized as primarily a political compromise. 
Much of the same reflections apply to the NO, protocol, but here one should also be aware 
of the 30% reduction political declaration, signed by a smaller group of parties. 
The 1991 VOC protocol is also binding and quite specific, and this protocol also marks a 
move towards greater flexibility: some countries are allowed to reduce emissions within 
specific "tropospheric ozone management areas", and there is also some flexibility with 
regard to baselinelstarting point. 
The most recent regulatory step is the revised sulfur protocol which was signed in Oslo in 
June 1994. It is both binding and specific, including both specified targets and timetables. 
However, the key point is how these elements are combined with flexibility on the basis of 
so-called "critical loads". The crux of this approach is that emissions reductions should be 
set on the basis of the varying effects of air pollutants, and the variations in abatement costs 
among countries, rather than by choosing an equal percentage reduction target for all 
countries involved. 
So far the rough regulatory development. What about the impact implications, then? Have for 
instance binding and more specific regulations led to higher implementation and more 
behavioral change than political declarations and less specific regulations? Let us first focus 
on the contrast between the 1979 convention and the 1985 30% protocol. An interesting thing 
to note here is that quite a lot of the emissions reductions witnessed in the 1980s occurred 
before the 1985 protocol was established. Hence, at first glance, it may seem that the 
generally worded convention led to almost as much behavioral change as the much more 
specific sulfur protocol. However, as indicated by the national case studies in the previous 
section, the main point must be that the impact question is first and foremost uncertain. 
Judging by the case studies focused in this report, neither the convention nor the protocol 
seem to account for very much of the emissions reductions witnessed. 
Moreover, a very interesting aspect related to the LRTAP nitrogen oxide processes is the 
contrast between the implementation performance related to the protocol versus the 
declaration. These regulations are of course not directly comparable, as the declaration's 30% 
target is a much more "ambitious" target than the protocol's stabilization target, and the 30% 
declaration is not formally part of the LRTAP structure. Still, despite such "methodological" 
problems, an interesting question is whether the seemingly lower compliance record related 
to the declaration than the protocol may have something to do with the formally less binding 
character of the declaration. But it is still possible that even if the countries do not achieve 
the 30% target, they may still have performed better than they would have done with only 
the protocol in operation.. . 
More generally, with regard to the impact of LRTAP rules, Marc Levy's (1993) concept of 
"toteboard diplomacy" is interesting. According to Levy, although the regulatory rules were 
weak, they were not irrelevant. "They served a vital role in magnifying pressure on 
recalcitrant states, in keeping the consensus-building activities high on governments' agendas, 
and in assisting domestic environmental proponents of action" (p.77). Hence, the "toteboard" 
perspective points toward a complex interplay picture, with various types of interactions 
between "structural", "regulative" and "external " causal factors. The regime process 
matters16 - yes - but making precise causal "measurements" of the contributions of the 
various factors in such a situation is quite challenging, and calls for more detailed, national 
research than has been carried out so far. 
Summing up: a regulatory development may be discerned, with regulations gradually 
becoming both binding, specific and more fine-tuned to ecological and economic variations 
among the countries. However, the impact implications of this regulatory development are 
quite tricky. It seems that substantial emissions reductions took place at a time before 
regulations became more specific and binding, and the main part of the more recent emissions 
reductions probably has nothing to do with the international regulations and/or their design. 
The possible "softer", more diffuse "toteboard" effects remain to be substantiated. 
16 In another context, I have suggested the term "discursive diplomacy" for these important, but 
elusive aspects of LRTAP decision-making and functioning (Wettestad, 1995 C). 
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6. Concluding Comments. Ten Acid Lessons. . . 
Let us sum up this study by giving tentative answers to the "ten most asked questions" 
formulated in the introduction. 
IS LRTAP A "HIGH-COMPLIANCE" REGIME? 
The answer must be in the affirmative. Significant emissions reductions have taken place. 
Regarding the 1985 sulfur protocol, all Parties have reached the 1993 30% target; and twelve 
Parties have achieved reductions of at least 50%. Regarding the 1988 NO, protocol, the 1994 
stabilization target has been reached by a clear majority of the Parties, but the data situation 
is not optimal; for instance three cases cannot be evaluated due to lacking base year data. 
Regarding the related 1998 30% reduction declaration, the perspectives are more gloomy; so 
far, an overall 4% reduction can be noted. Finally, with regard to VOC, of the eleven 
countries (out of 23 Parties) providing data for 1993, an overall reduction of around 15% 
may be noted. Hence, there is some way to go in relation to the 1999 30% target. 
HAVE THE ACID RAIN PROBLEMS ADDRESSED BY LRTAP BEEN SOLVED SO FAR? 
WOULD THE PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN WORSE WTHOUT THE LRTAP REGIME? 
With regard to the first part of this question: no. For instance, the situation in Norway has 
seemingly only worsened in the 1990s. Due to among other things time lags between 
developments in emissions and changes in the environment, the emission cuts achieved so far 
have not yet led to marked improvements. Overall, "solution" and getting below "critical 
loads" in the environment is partly a matter related to the implementation of newly established 
regulations, and in reality demanding even further emission cuts, extending well into the next 
century. Would the problems have been worse without the LRTAP regime? Yes, but the 
specific LRTAP contribution so far is uncertain - probably not very high, but hard to 
"measure" precisely. But what about "critical loads" and the new, perhaps uniquely advanced 
protocol? Well, this indicates that there is a process dimension to regime effectiveness that 
a strict "behavioral" definition ignores. In a process, more forward-looking perspective, the 
LRTAP achievements seem more impressive. 
ARE THE MAJOR CAUSAL FACTORS FOR COMPLIANCE LEVELS F O U .  WTHIN THE 
SPHERE OF "ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS" ? 
Seemingly no, at least not in three of the four countries focused in this study. The main part 
of the reductions and compliance levels achieved in these three countries (the UK, 
Netherlands, and Norway) are seemingly explained by societal processes not primarily related 
to environmental protection, at least with regard to sulfur reductions. In the UK, industrial 
recession and lowered energy demand in the 1980s are important factors. In the Netherlands, 
a gradual conversion to "domestic" natural gas for supply and domestic political and financial 
reasons is an important perspective. In Norway, much has been achieved by decreasing 
consumption of heavy crude oil on land. The exception is Germany, where "environmental 
regulations" in fact seem to be the main driving force. 
However: motivations for policy measures are often multiple and hard to track exactly, so 
these conclusions should definitely be regarded as tentative. 
CAN "NATIONAL INTERESTS" ROUGHLY PREDICT LEVELS OF COMPLIANCE? 
To some extent they can. As could be expected, countries with substantial perceived acid 
damages like Norway and (West) Germany have ended up as far stronger implementors than 
the marginally damaged "acid exporter" the UK. Moreover, this perspective seems to be 
more relevant in the sulfur context than in the NO, context. This may have something to do 
with "structural" differences between the sulfur and NO, problems - with sulfur emissions 
very much stemming from a limited, "overseeable" number of industrial point sources, while 
NO, emissions involving a number of other, more diffuse transport actors, complicating both 
present and future abatement cost estimates. 
Still, there are several problems with this perspective in an "environmental implementation" 
context: first, decisions about national compliance and implementation in this context are 
continuous, and hence, the questions of costs and benefits are "moving targets". Second, even 
if we imagine only one decision to comply or not early in the process (as I have tentatively 
tried), the questions of costs and benefits are complicated. A common observation is that 
costs are somewhat easier to quantify than benefits, and it is easy to imagine that the balance 
is tilted in that direction. Third, the relevance of the domestic politics perspectives is in a 
sense structurally given by the fact that important implementation agents (like power stations 
and firms) have not been under direct societal control. Hence, no matter how the 
governmental weighing of costs and benefits turns out, some "societal bargaining" over 
regulatory terms and implementation seems inevitable. Somewhat paradoxically, the main 
exception is the "laggard" UK, where power stations were under governmental control in 
most of the relevant period. Here, lack of "green" governmental will and strong leadership 
in the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) combined to make the formally promising 
control over abatement processes irrelevant. 
WHAT ASPECTS OF DOMESTIC POLITICS MATTER MOST? 
This varies of course, both between processes and between countries. 
As indicated above, a central "domestic" factor shedding light over the seemingly higher 
implementation effectiveness of the sulfur process compared to the NO, process is the 
differences in regulatory affectedness; i.e. the number and type of actors targeted in 
regulatory processes - with more and, somewhat surprisingly, seemingly less "governable" 
actors being involved in the NO, processes. In this respect, the common unifying theme in 
the cases is the difficulty of predicting and dealing with emissions from road traffic. 
In other respects, the differences between the sulfur and NO, processes in the countries seem 
to vary, with Norway as a clear example of sharp differences between the processes. In this 
country, the NO, issue led to a protracted inter-ministerial battle, unheard of when less costly 
sulfur controls were established and implemented.. . 
Another matter shedding light over the differences between the processes is of course the fact 
that the sulfur issue has had a longer scientific and regulatory history than the NO, issue, 
giving sulfur a certain regulatory "head start". 
With regard to other differences and similarities between the countries, differences in 
regulatory philosophies and styles seem to throw much light on the different roles and 
performances of the UK and Germany. A "consensual" regulatory model may throw light on 
the relative lack of Dutch domestic conflict over regulatory policies. Public opinion and 
public pressure seem to have been important forces in Germany, but not very much in the 
other countries. The generally weak position of environmental ministries in inter-ministerial 
wranglings shed light over the question "why not a(n) (even) stronger implementation record" 
in several of the countries. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the federal structure of Germany 
seems not to have complicated German processes much; in fact, this structure led to a green 
competition between central and local forces, and infused extra political energy into the 
development of acid policies. Personal factors, like the Thatcher "small club" decision- 
making style in the UK, should not be ignored. An interesting observation: contrary to an 
intuitive assumption that it is easier for public authorities to influence actors within the public 
apparatus than private actors, 
it was seemingly easier to influence German private target groups than British public ones. 
WHAT ROLE HAS LRTAP PLA YED FOR NATIONAL "ACID REDUCTIONS", COMPARED 
TO OTHER INTERNATIONAL FACTORS AND "PURE" NATIONAL FACTORS? 
The short answer is: not very much for these particular countries. The LRTAP process is 
obviously important as an arena for the creation and maintenance of inter-governmental 
confidence and learning. But if LRTAP had not existed, significant reductions would have 
taken place due to "non-environmental" processes and "environmental political pressure" 
motivated by domestic damages. The most obvious and important example is Germany. 
After domestic uproar about "Waldsterben" (which the public associated with acid rain and 
pollution) and related national policy initiatives, Germany changed from "laggard" to 
"pusher" on the international arena - with LRTAP and the EC as two main useful fora. More 
generally, with regard to German and British acid rain politics, the EC decision-making arena 
has probably been more important than LRTAP. However: there is still a possibility that 
LRTAP has been more important for the other West and East European countries not 
discussed here. For instance, Levy (1993:123) indicates that LRTAP has influenced 
emissions policies in countries like the former USSR. 
ARE THERE CERTAIN FEATURES OF LRTAP INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN THAT HAVE 
BEEN MORE IMPORTANT THAN OTHERS? 
Given the answer above, this is bound to be a tricky discussion "on the margin". Still, some 
tentative observations may be offered. Given that so many observers and "insiders" stress the 
confidence-building and learning aspects related to LRTAP, three factors stand out from the 
rest. First, the very existence of the protocols themselves has obviously given increased 
confidence to hesitant countries that important emitters were taking this problem quite 
seriously. The regulations also created a certain basis for limited inter-state pressure - cf. the 
notion of "toteboard diplomacy" (Levy, 1993), where in a sense weak LRTAP regulatory 
rules have served a role in magnifying pressure on recalcitrant states, in keeping the 
consensus-building activities high on governments' agendas, and in assisting domestic 
environmental proponents of action. Second, the diverse scientific-political complex, with 
the well-functioning EMEP monitoring system as a solid core, provided information crucial 
to the progress of the process, especially in the early 1980s. Third, EMEP data also 
contributed to making verification of the various countries' implementation processes more 
trustworthy, further building confidence (for further comments to this issue, see di Primio, 
1996). 
HOW HAVE THE MOST IMPORTANT INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES AFFECTED POLICY 
AND IMPLEMENTATION PROCESSES? 
Based on information about the countries focused here, by far the most important mechanism 
within the LRTAP regime has been the provision of information, and the related interplay 
between governmental and non-governmental national actors. The British case is the best 
documented with regard to the functioning of this mechanism. Both NGOs and more official 
political bodies actively utilized LRTAP reports and regulations to put pressure on the British 
government, however with little short-term success. As more of a digression, it may be 
indicated that the international provision of "legitimizing" authority and capability to scientists 
and environmental authorities may be an important additional mechanism in Eastern Europe. 
ARE THERE MANY AREAS OF CONFLICTING ASSESSMENTS IN CURRENT 
LITERATURE? 
No. Although LRTAP may be one of the most "advanced" and well-researched among the 
environmental regimes, the bulk of the studies so far are of a quite general nature and focus 
on regime formation and process/negotiation aspects. Hence, not very many detailed studies 
of the policy and implementation processes yet exist. In the few cases where several national 
studies have been carried out, concepts and foci vary quite a bit. Take for instance the UK 
situation: later studies, like the Waterton (1993) UK case study (which is one of the case 
studies within the Clark/ "Social learning" project), draw heavily on "seminal " studies by 
authors like McCormick (1989) and not least Boehmer-ChristiansenISkea (1991) - without 
explicit critical examinations of the earlier results. This is understandable, as 
"implementation" is only one of a number of issues addressed by Waterton and the 
Clark/"Social learning" project. Hence, research so far has been mainly complementary. 
However, the situation may be changing, as new studies from several large-scale projects are 
in the process of being published (e.g. the Clark and HanfIUnderdal projects). What about 
the crucial effectiveness question - do analysts agree? To a large extent, yes. There seems 
to be a shared feeling of "more success than failure". But due to lacking implementation 
information, and not least lacking information about the emissions reduction that would have 
taken place "anyway" due to general economic and energy policy development, uncertainty 
is still substantial. Take Marc Levy (1993:126), who has probably carried out the most 
elaborate assessments so far; "the sulfur protocol probably had significant effects on the 
emission reductions in seven countries, including the largest and fourth-largest emitters in 
Europe (USSR and United Kingdom). A protocol that affects only these seven probably 
counts as a success" (my emphasis added). 
WHAT ARE THE MAIN CHALLENGES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH? 
Generally, with regard to implementation knowledge, quite understandably, so far much more 
focus has been directed towards the "older" sulfur process than the somewhat more recent 
Nox and VOC processes. Hence, we need to direct more attention to the latter processes. 
With regard to more specific themes, the challenges depend of course on what type of 
processes we are interested in. In order to say something about the causally most important 
processes for past and future implementation processes, we should probably focus on mainly 
"non-environmental processes like energy supply trends, energy prices, industrial 
development trends, long-term transport trends - and so on. Given the interest many of us 
share in "causally less important, but politically more manipulable". . institutional international 
and national processes, two main, partly linked, areas may be indicated. First, international- 
domestic access and participation linkages is obviously an interesting field of inquiry. What 
did participation in international scientific and political bodies mean for the "national power 
position" of scientists, NGOs and administrators? How was the open international access 
utilized domestically by various domestic forces, like industry and environmentalists? What 
about the differences between types of issues; e.g. do lessons from the older and, in terms 
of actors, simpler sulfur process hold true in more recent processes where the challenge is 
to handle participation by a number of stakeholders, many of whom oppose expensive 
implementation measures? Some information about these issues already exists, like for 
instance in the case of Britain, so it is very much a case of focusing and augmenting existing 
knowledge. Second, the interplay between EC and LRTAP processes should be further 
clarified. Also in this case, it is more a question of focusing and augmenting current 
knowledge than to start from scratch. Here, among other things, the SEER2 phase within the 
Hanf EC-financed project will give us useful information on this interplay. 
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